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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the global political hegemons, the world 
has seen an influx of deadly intrastate conflicts.  The Responsibility to Protect doctrine emerged 
to address the global challenges raised by these civil wars, stating that humanitarian intervention 
is both necessary at times and a responsibility of the international community. The R2P doctrine 
was adopted in 2005, but the UN Security Council has struggled to consistently determine where, 
when, and how humanitarian interventions should be authorized to take place.  The purpose o f 
this research is to identify factors that influence UN Security Council decision making and 
determine the role of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine for current and future cases of 
humanitarian crisis.        
The methodology for this thesis is primarily a study of two select cases of intrastate conflict.  
The thesis will compare the UN's responses to the war in Darfur and the conflict in Libya.  In 
addition to the case studies, the study of contemporary literature will help to explain the current 
state of humanitarian intervention and R2P.  The results of the research show that humanitarian 
intervention is legal under the UN Charter, used and accepted by the international community, 
and a legitimate tool of the United Nations.  There are many political and logistical 
complications surrounding the use of humanitarian intervention, and UN Security Council 
decision making in the cases of Darfur and Libya was influenced by terminology and language, 
national interests, host state consent, other military campaigns, and the anticipated cost.  Even 
though the policy has been difficult to implement, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has 
emerged as the only potentially useful international policy for preventing domestic conflicts from 
escalating and is now an integral part of humanitarian intervention.  Further development and 
integration of the R2P doctrine, based on these results, could help to prevent future humanitarian 
crises.     
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Introduction A Doctrine in the Interest of All Nations  
With the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the Cold War ended and the world was no 
longer dominated by global hegemons.  The US and the USSR lost the ability to control the 
satellite states within their political bloc and simmering tensions within many of these states 
surged to the forefront, resulting in a wave of civil wars.  A new doctrine emerged to address the 
global challenges raised by these civil wars - the Responsibility to Protect.  The Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) doctrine states that humanitarian intervention is both necessary at times and a 
responsibility of the international community.  R2P was first proposed in a report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001.  
The main tenet of the report is that "sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe...but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states."1  In 2005, the United Nations 
(UN) held a World Summit where it reaffirmed its commitment to creating "a more peaceful, 
prosperous and democratic world and to undertake concrete measures to continue finding ways 
to implement the outcome of...major United Nations conferences and summits."2  R2P was 
officially adopted at this summit.  UN member states have since pledged to work to define an 
"authoritative framework" that would give "doctrinal, policy and institutional life to the 
responsibility to protect."3  Humanitarian intervention is legal under the UN Charter, used and 
accepted by the international community, and a legitimate tool of the United Nations.  Even 
though the policy has been difficult to implement, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has 
emerged as the only potentially useful international policy for preventing domestic conflicts from 
escalating.   
 This thesis argues that, despite the many complications surrounding its use, the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine is now an integral part of humanitarian intervention for the 
future.  These complications will be illustrated by case studies of the war in Darfur and the 
                                                 
1
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect,"  Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research 
Centre, 2001): VIII.      
2
 United Nations General Assembly, " Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: 60/1. 2005 World Summit 
Outcome,"  (A/Res/60/1 of the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly, October 24, 2005): 3.       
3
 United Nations General Assembly, "Implementing the responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General,"  
(A/63/677 of the 63rd session of the United Nations General Assembly, January 12, 2009): 4.     
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conflict in Libya.  Over the past thirty years, the United Nations has wrestled with the challenges 
of determining when and how to intervene in violent intrastate conflicts, settling on the doctrine 
of the Responsibility to Protect as the cornerstone of its new approach.  The Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine exists beyond military intervention, to include a commitment to both the 
prevention of conflicts and the rebuilding of communities post- intervention.  However, this 
thesis will focus on the responsibility to intervene in the event that a government is failing to 
protect its citizens as R2P was primarily created in reaction to extreme humanitarian disasters 
which received little to no international response.  Since the end of the Cold War, support for 
humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts has increased, and the introduction of the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been the most significant development on this front.  R2P 
should have a major role in future development, both as a distinct policy and as a guiding 
principle of humanitarian intervention.   Even with its flaws and failures, R2P is a UN policy that 
can, over time, advance humanitarian intervention.  Throughout this thesis, unless otherwise 
specified, use of 'the Responsibility to Protect' or 'R2P' will generally refer to the Responsibility 
to Protect doctrine and its conceptual principles, with a specific focus on the responsibility to 
intervene when a government is manifestly failing to protect its citizens.  Use of the term 
'humanitarian intervention' will generally refer to the applied practice of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes, with a specific focus on the practical application of interventions under 
the guiding principles of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.        
Protecting civilians suffering atrocities is a clear priority of the United Nations, but the 
UNSC’s authorization of the use of force remains mired with complications.  This makes R2P all 
the more difficult to enact.  An examination of two international humanitarian crises will 
demonstrate the difficulties in implementing humanitarian intervention, including competing 
national interests, disputed international norms, realistic UN capabilities, and fluid geo-political 
complexities.  The first case study focuses on Sudan and the conflict in Darfur.  In 2003, a group 
of African rebels in the western Darfur region of Sudan rose up against President Omar Bashir, 
claiming they had been neglected for years in favor of the Arab Sudanese.  A government  
"counterinsurgency"4 campaign ensued, characterized by mass killings of ethnic Africans.  It was 
not until 2008, five years after the conflict began, that the United Nations officially intervened on 
                                                 
4
 Jewish World Watch, "Darfur Genocide," Jewish World Watch,  
http://www.jewishworldwatch.org/conflictareas/sudan/overview/sudan-genocide.    
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the ground.5   The second case study examines the confusing and ongoing situation in Libya.  
Citizen protests spurred a brutal regime crackdown by Colonel Muammar Gadhafi in February of 
2011 which resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians.6  On March 17, 2011, a month after 
the initial conflict had started, the United Nations Security Council voted on a large military 
intervention operation, authorizing a NATO-imposed no-fly zone which permitted "all necessary 
measures to protect civilians."7  
The UN has been highly criticized over inconsistency when responding to different 
international crises.  Analyzing the realities of cases requiring intervention may help to predict 
the lasting global impact of the Responsibility to Protect.  At the very least, it will highlight some 
of the obstacles to implementing R2P and streamlining decision making.  Several possible 
explanations for the differing UN responses in Darfur and Libya are proposed.   Aside from 
systemic challenges, like the issue of sovereignty, Security Council disagreement, and UN 
inefficiency, there are a number of situational obstacles to R2P.  These include the language 
surrounding each crisis, the existence of host-state consent, the proximity to other large scale 
operations, strategic interests in the region, and cost-benefit analysis.  Most recently, the Libyan 
crisis has had the greatest impact on the Responsibility to Protect.  Although the initial resolution 
to intervene was significant for its reference to R2P, there has been considerable criticism of the 
aftermath of the Libyan campaign and the country's continuing violence.  The Libyan mission 
has also affected the deadly conflict in Syria.  The extended mission in Libya has been described 
as an overstepping of the original UN mandate and has been cited as a reason for stalemate in the 
Security Council over action in Syria.8  Ultimately, the international system will always be 
complex and unpredictable, but the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has emerged as a serious 
attempt to regulate it.  
                                                 
5
 As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, many UN states lacked the polit ical will to intervene in Darfur and 
withheld resources and support despite 9 resolutions on the Darfur crisis .  See John Prendergast and David Sullivan,  
“Irresolution: The U.N. Security Council on Darfur,”  Enough Project (2008),  
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/irresolution-un-security-council-darfur.     
6
 BBC News Africa, "Libya revolt : Gaddafi in crimes against humanity probe," BBC, accessed April 9, 2014,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12636798.  
7
 Richard Roth, "U.N. Security Council approves no-fly zone in Libya,"  CNN , March 18, 2011, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/17/libya.civ il.war/index.html?iref=allsearch .   
8
 Joshua Foust, "Syria and the Pernicious Consequences of Our Libya Intervention ,"  The Atlantic, February 6, 2012,  
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/syria -and-the-pernicious-consequences-of-our-libya-
intervention/252631/.    
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The term 'humanitarian intervention' can refer to differing UN and international activities, 
including impartial peacekeeping, peace brokering, the administration of aid, or the response to 
natural disasters.  Daniel Baer defines humanitarian intervention as, “military action by the 
soldiers of a state or group of states within the borders of another state without its permission and 
with the immediate aim of preventing or ending massive violations of human rights or 
widespread human suffering.”9 Adam Roberts similarly describes it as, “coercive action by one 
or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its 
authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the 
inhabitants.”10  For this thesis, the focus will be on UN-authorized military responses to 
situations of humanitarian disaster,  involving the explicit use of military force to remedy human 
rights violations.11   
Jennifer Welsh, a former professor of international relations at the University of Oxford,  
was appointed in June 2013 as a Special Advisor at the UN Assistant Secretary-General level on 
the Responsibility to Protect.12  Welsh gives a similar definition as Baer and Roberts, but is less 
specific about the existence of host state consent, allowing for more manoeuvrability when 
classifying operations.  Based on Welsh's conception, the term 'humanitarian intervention' 
throughout this thesis will refer to a UN-authorized “coercive interference in the internal affairs 
of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human 
rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering.”13  Humanitarian interventions 
function with or without host state consent and can involve the possible authority to use all 
means necessary to successfully protect human lives, UN personnel or otherwise.  Under this 
definition, the intervention in Somalia in 1992 is an example of humanitarian intervention.  The 
UN Security Council authorized a military operation on December 3, to be carried out by the 
United States, in response to the deteriorating political and humanitarian situation caused by a 
                                                 
9
 Daniel Baer, “The ult imate sacrifice and the ethics of humanitarian intervention,” Review of International Studies 
37(1) (2011): 302.   
10
 Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: War and Conflict in the Modern World  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2012): 6. 
11
 Francis Kofi Abiew, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Redefining a Role for the 
‘Kind-hearted Gunmen,’” Criminal Justice Ethics 29(2) (2010): 95.   
12
 Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,  "Secretary-General Appoints Jennifer Welsh of 
Canada as Special Adviser," United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/jenniferwelsh.shtml.    
13
 Jennifer M. Welsh, “The Security Council and Humanitarian Intervention,” in The United Nations Security 
Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice 1945, ed. Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, 
and Dominik Zaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 537   
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civil war.  The goal of 'Operation Restore Hope' was to "impose order through military force" 
and stop the ongoing violence, so that UN humanitarian aid to the area could safely resume.14  
It is evident from the development of R2P that thinking on humanitarian intervention and 
its use has changed considerably over the past few decades and there is a wide body of literature 
attempting to explain that change.  A good deal of recent academic work on the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine praises its emergence and maintains that it could impact the practice of 
intervention in a positive way.15  The genocide in Rwanda has been cited as the catalyst which 
initiated modern thinking on the necessity of humanitarian intervention and R2P.16  Authors Alex 
J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams argue that, after Rwanda, a new “politics of protect ion,” 
developed, characterized by a renewed commitment to the protection of civilians. 17  
Additionally, this new politics of protection is committed to security through the use of force if 
necessary, but always under the proper authority.  Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur are 
principal members of the commission that devised the R2P doctrine.  Although they "do not 
pretend that there is now anything close to unanimous consensus...as to how R2P should be 
applied in every case where mass atrocity crimes are...occurring," and acknowledge that the 
Security Council is somewhat paralyzed on the subject since Libya in 2011, they remain 
optimistic.18  Evans and Thakur argue that the Responsibility to Protect has evolved since 2001 
and is worthwhile because of its focus on the victims of humanitarian abuse rather than nations 
undertaking an intervention, emphasis on other duties of the international community like the 
responsibility to rebuild societies after conflicts, and its prudential criteria for the use of force.19 
                                                 
14
 Mark Amstutz, International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008), 170.   
15
 Despite many flaws, R2P is a "relevant change and can produce a transformation in humanitarian intervention in 
the long run," based on its ethical perspective and the fact that "at the heart of this conceptual approach is a shift in 
thinking about the essence of sovereignty, from control to responsibility."  Liliana L. Jubiliut, “Has the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ Been a Real Change in Humanitarian Intervention? An Analysis from the Crisis in 
Libya,” International Community Law Review 14(4) (2012): 335.  See also Luke Glanville, “In Defense of the 
Responsibility to Protect,” (2013); Jessica Almqvist, "Enforcing the responsibility to protect through solidarity 
measures," (2015).      
16 See also Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, “Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons from Somalia 
to Libya,” (2011); Chelsea O'Donnell, "The Development of the Responsibility to Protect: An Examination of the 
Debate Over the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention," (2014).     
17
 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect,” International Affairs 87(4) (2011): 826.   
18 Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect ," International 
Security, 37(4) (2013): 200.   
19
 Ibid, 202-207.   
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On the other hand, concerns still exist about how to and when to implement R2P.20  
Authors Bellamy and Williams admit that there are still challenges to be worked through for UN 
intervention, like predicting effective means of protection in advance, engaging with complicated 
local political dynamics, and managing the longer-term implications of UN actions.21 The 
Security Council is charged with maintaining international peace and security, yet much 
literature is critical of its intermittent inability to act or agree on controversial issues.  The 
Security Council’s commitment to humanitarian intervention is commonly described as mixed or 
uneven according to Jennifer M. Welsh. 22  Although a proponent of R2P, Welsh argues that the 
UN often lacks the ability to undertake humanitarian interventions and frequently is 
incapacitated by unsupportive member states and uncooperative governments.  Francis Kofi 
Abiew argues that the R2P doctrine has yet to be implemented fully. 23 Full implementation 
would include the incorporation of R2P as a clear and detailed principle with the authority and 
legitimacy to dictate UN intervention decisions.  Abiew believes that humanitarian intervention 
has been theoretically strengthened because of the adoption of R2P, but practical implementation 
still depends on “the political will of the international community to follow through in extreme 
cases that require the use of military force.”24  R2P could potentially be a framework for UN 
Security Council decision making, but Abiew would argue that it is still too soon to tell whether 
the UN will continue to strengthen the doctrine.    
 
Method Design and Theory   
 
The methodology for this thesis is primarily a study of two select cases of intra-state 
conflict.  The thesis will compare the UN's responses to the war in Darfur and the conflict in 
Libya.  In addition to the case studies, the study of contemporary literature will help to explain 
the current state of humanitarian intervention and R2P.  The research method is qualitative 
analysis of a combination of academic works, United Nations direct source material, and 
literature in the form of periodicals and online news reports.  UN official statements are the 
                                                 
20
 See also David Berman and Christopher Michaelsen, "Intervention in Libya: Another Nail in the Coffin fo r the 
Responsibility to Protect?" (2012); Conor Fo ley, "The Evolving Legit imacy of Humanitarian Interv entions," (2013).   
21
 Bellamy, "The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," 826.   
22
 Welsh, “The Security Council and Humanitarian Intervention,” 556.   
23
 Ibid.  See also Justin Morris, "Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum," (2013).    
24
 Abiew, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect,” 105.   
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primary source of data on the differences between the interventions in Libya and Darfur.  The 
conflicts in Darfur and Libya were chosen as case studies for this thesis based on their 
international notoriety and relevance to the Responsibility to Protect.  This thesis will discuss 
specific characteristics of the two events as well as international relations theory on humanitarian 
intervention and R2P to explain the discrepancies between the two UNSC responses and evaluate 
the future potential of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.     
The research and discussion of this thesis fits primarily within the international relations 
theory of liberalism.  Liberalism, and other theories of foreign policy, provide a conceptual 
framework upon which to analyze the interaction and politics of states.  At its core, liberalism 
assumes that human nature is essentially good.  The liberal tradition is rooted in the 
philosophical works of many great theorists, including John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau.  These theorists believe in legitimate political authority stemming from the 
consent of the citizenry.25  Government, at its core, should have a limited constitution that 
provides the foundation for human rights.26  There are several theories of liberalism in 
international relations, including liberal pacifism, based on a belief that the gradual spread of 
economic rationalism and democratic will lead to peace, and liberal imperialism, which argues 
that democratic states should engage in the active exportation and expansion of liberal 
democratic values.27   
Liberal internationalism is the most widely accepted theory today, and it incorporates 
aspects from all branches of liberalism.  This theory of liberalism in global politics is based 
primarily on the philosophic work of Immanuel Kant.  Kant argued that "peace among nation-
states is best maintained through an informal federation of republican regimes," and those states 
must be governed responsibly.28  Based on this notion, liberal internationalists maintain that 
"mankind will ultimately choose socio-political and economic integration," leading to one global 
community. 29  In addition to this main assumption, liberal internationalism is defined by several 
other basic principles.  According to Knight and Keating,30 individuals are the primary actors in 
global politics, and they act in a rational and moral manner.  Individuals need governments to 
                                                 
25
 Amstutz, International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics, 52.   
26
 Ibid.   
27
 W. Andy Knight and Tom Keating, Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010): 34.   
28
 Amstutz, International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics, 52.   
29
 Knight and Keating, Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges, 34.    
30
 Ibid, 37.   
  
8 
 
provide security but governments should not inhibit individual freedoms.  Liberal states have 
democratic governments that are founded on the ideas of freedom, equality, civil liberties, and 
human rights.  These states are less likely to wage war against each other and are further bound 
together by free trade and commerce.  Liberal internationalists maintain that international 
relations are being transformed over time to promote greater human freedom, peace, equality and 
justice, driven by global cooperation and democratization.31                
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine and several of the main concepts discussed in this 
thesis are products of liberal theory and can be rationalized within the framework of the 
aforementioned assumptions of liberal internationalism.  Discussion in this thesis is primarily 
based on the liberal assumption that states are interested in creating lasting global peace.  The 
United Nations, a central component to the discussion on legal and legitimate humanitarian 
intervention, is a prime example of states choosing an economic and political global partnership 
in the interest of cooperation and peace.  Assuming that the UN is a functioning model of global 
governance, then the existence of the organization reinforces the liberal internationalist premise 
that states are integrating into a single community.  As will be discussed further in Chapter One, 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine  is based on the liberal idea that individuals have human 
rights, including the right to live in peace and freedom.  Governments serve to protect those 
freedoms, as reflected in their responsibility to their citizens under R2P.  Furthermore, the 
universality of human rights, the development of humanitarian intervention, and the adoption of 
the R2P doctrine, are all evidence of the liberal internationalist 'transformation' of international 
relations towards promoting freedom, peace, and justice.        
The thesis will be organized as follows.  Chapter one will establish that humanitarian 
intervention is a legal, accepted, and legitimate tool of the United Nations.  Arguments in favour 
of humanitarian intervention will be presented.  The development of peacekeeping into 
humanitarian intervention and the origins of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine will be 
discussed in detail.  Chapter two discusses the political and logistical obstacles which hinder the 
practical implementation of humanitarian intervention and R2P, including conceptual arguments 
against their use.  These difficulties need to be understood for R2P to remain relevant.  The third 
chapter will discuss the case studies of Darfur and Libya and the world's responses.   A 
comparison of these crises illustrates further the current obstacles to the practical implementation 
                                                 
31
 Knight and Keating, Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges, 37. 
  
9 
 
of R2P and the permanent realities of the international system that inhibit its utility.  The Libyan 
intervention has proven to be much more complex than anticipated, but R2P remains just as 
relevant in the post- intervention period.       
Chapter four will analyze the UN's responses to the conflicts in Darfur and Libya and 
discuss the factors that influenced decision making in both cases.  There have been many 
humanitarian crises and UN miscalculations during the past few decades but mistakes are often 
the drivers of meaningful change in global principles.  Although controversy over the fallout 
from the Libyan intervention has clearly negatively impacted the Responsibility to Protect, 32 the 
doctrine is far from abandoned.  The thesis will conclude by commenting on the state of 
humanitarian intervention in international affairs after the controversial intervention in Libya.  
The conclusion will also discuss the potential future for the Responsibility to Protect.  Since its 
inception, R2P has enhanced humanitarian intervention norms .  It is important for the 
maintenance of global peace and security that this trend continues.  There are challenges that 
make practical implementation difficult, but despite these, R2P and humanitarian intervention 
are relevant, valuable, and realistic policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Evans, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect ," 200.   
  
10 
 
Chapter 1 The Establishment of Humanitarian Intervention  
 
 State sovereignty is the foundation of the current international system.  This system can be 
dated back to the Peace of Westphalia, a collection of treaties signed in 1648 which ended the 
Thirty Years War33 and introduced a new era of political relations in Europe and the rest of the 
world.  For the next three hundred years, the Westphalian agreement endured as a "pan-European 
diplomatic system based on the new principles of sovereignty and legal equality, and a balance 
of power that would prevent drives for hegemony."34  The Peace of Westphalia has been 
described as "the starting point for the development of modern international law."35  The 
sovereignty resulting from the Westphalian system promises states independence and security.   
However, as will be discussed further in Chapter Two, humanitarian intervention is in direct 
conflict with state sovereignty and it is a clear obstacle for the UN during inter-state 
humanitarian efforts.  Responsibility to Protect is the United Nations' current doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention and it has the potential to be an essential principle of international 
affairs.  The R2P doctrine lays out a framework to encourage the UN and the Security Council to 
be more definitive in crisis situations, addressing past complications with UN non-intervention.  
Although R2P, and humanitarian intervention, continue to be a point of contention for the 
Security Council, modern international discourse on the issue tends to settle on the view that it is, 
at times, necessary. 
 Since the United Nations was created in 1945, threats to international peace and security 
have changed dramatically.  Traditional UN peacekeeping gave way to more militarized 
strategies, like humanitarian intervention.  The end of the Cold War effectively opened up the 
international system, giving states, which were previously constrained by allegiances to Cold 
War hegemons, the freedom to govern and interact independently.36  However, this ideological 
freedom also allowed for the intensification of ethnic rivalries, often resulting in violence.37  The 
reality of the international community today is that humanitarian crises are a major concern and 
interventions are discussed and considered on a regular basis.  Since 2008 alone, there have been 
                                                 
33
 Kalevi J. Holsti,  Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 26. 
34
 Ibid.   
35
 Ibid, 39.   
36
 Knight and Keating, Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges, 102.     
37
 Ibid.   
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eight different cases of possible genocide or ethnic cleansing publicly monitored by the United 
Nations.  These cases include the Democratic of the Congo in 2008, Sri Lanka in 2009, 
Kyrgyzstan and Guinea in 2010, Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011, Sudan in 2011, and Syria in 
2011.38  This chapter will demonstrate that humanitarian intervention is legal under the UN 
Charter, accepted by the international community, and a legitimate UN tool for conflict 
resolution, and as such should be an essential principle of international affairs.   
  
International Legitimacy and the Rise of R2P   
 As stated in the introduction,  the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is meant to be a 
definitive doctrinal statement on global accountability and humanitarian intervention.  The 
doctrine attempts to streamline the decision making process of humanitarian intervention and 
improve the efficiency of the UNSC.  R2P was first proposed in a report created by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and was later adopted 
unanimously by over 150 Heads of State and Government as part of the 2005 UN World Summit 
Outcome document.  The Summit discussions were aimed at solving problems in the areas of 
development, peace and collective security, human rights and the rule of law, and strengthening 
the United Nations.  The Outcome document outlines measures to implement the results of those 
discussions, including R2P.   
 The Responsibility to Protect doctrine contains three foundational pillars which are meant 
to serve as a guideline for action in situations of humanitarian crisis :   
1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;  
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in 
fulfilling this responsibility; 
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes.  If a State is 
manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be 
prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations.39          
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Collective action is defined by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty as, "appropriate measures...which may include coercive measures like sanctions and 
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention."40  In Article 138 of the 
2005 outcome document, the United Nations pledged that,  
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means.  We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.  The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 41 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine advocates for humanitarian intervention, in some 
situations.  R2P not only affirms the right of countries to intervene, it mandates that states are 
obligated to take military action to remedy human rights violations when necessary.   
 The legitimacy of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is underscored by its acceptance in 
the international community.  The road to international acceptance of the Responsibility to 
Protect began in the 1950s and 1960s, when classical peacekeeping proved insufficient for many 
UN operations.  This trend continued after the end of the Cold War and intensified after a series 
of globally denounced crises in the 1990s, particularly the crises in Somalia, Rwanda, and the 
former Yugoslavia.42   Former Secretary General Kofi Annan's insistence on change to 
humanitarian strategies was also very influential for the R2P doctrine.  Annan encouraged the 
United Nations to further explore some of its responsibilities as an internationally governing 
institution and called out to governments and political experts for assistance.  Eventually, the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was created and the 
Responsibility to Protect was born.   
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 The Evolution of Peacekeeping into Humanitarian Intervention 
 
 Peacekeeping is the most identifiable tool for maintaining international peace and security 
and is widely used by the United Nations.  However, military humanitarian intervention is 
arguably more effective for quelling deadly violence.  This type of intervention evolved out of 
traditional forms of peacekeeping. The very first peacekeeping operations were born of three 
essential principles: “consent of the parties; impartiality; [and] Non-use of force except in self-
defence and defence of the mandate.”43  Peacekeeping operations are used in situations where a 
conflict has very recently ended and is essentially requiring mediation for ensuring the delicate 
transition to lasting peace, monitoring the adherence to agreements, and rebuilding society and 
laws.  Peacekeeping can trace its most basic roots back to operations in 1948, with small scale 
UN deployments to the Middle East, and in 1949 in India and Pakistan.  What has been 
described as the “first peacekeeping force per se”44 is the premier UN peacekeeping force with 
armed observers.   The first UN Emergency Force to the Middle East (UNEF I) was dispatched 
in 1956 to quell the Suez crisis after hostilities broke out between Egypt and Israel over 
operation and control of the Suez Canal.  Britain and France also had economic interests in the 
canal, and the invasion by Israeli forces of Egypt in October 1956 provided an opportunity for 
external intervention.   The observer units of UNEF I were authorized to use their weapons “only 
in self-defence and even then with utmost restraint.”45 Their main function consisted of 
“[supervising] the withdrawal of the three occupying forces and.....[acting] as a buffer between 
the Egyptian and Israeli forces to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire.”46  Withdrawn 
in 1967 after Egypt no longer consented to the presence of UN troops in the region, UNEF I was 
a first stepping stone for later armed peacekeeping forces like UNEF II in the same region in 
1973, UNSF and UNTEA forces in West New Guinea in 1962, and the UN Peacekeeping Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964.   
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 With the evolution of international peace and security concerns since the first 
peacekeeping operation in 1948 there has also been a change in the strategies necessary to 
maintain that security.  A great deal of this change can also be attributed to later peacekeeping 
missions whose near or glaring failures illuminated the deficiencies of the traditional tactic.  
Humanitarian intervention as a concept was in large part born out of the attempted rectification 
of these failures.  A simple, but effective, indicator of situations where peacekeeping is not 
appropriate is the lack of peace to keep.  These situations are generally very volatile.  The UN 
Operation in the Congo (ONUC), beginning in 1960, demonstrates “the risks involved in trying 
to bring stability to war-torn regions...250 UN personnel died while serving on that mission, 
including the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.”47  Classical peacekeeping was exposed as 
inadequate in situations of this magnitude, as UN troops attempted to quell escalating violence 
after the Congo declared independence.  UN troops were eventually authorized to take all 
necessary measures to prevent civil war,48 and thus began the qualitative expansion of 
peacekeeping into humanitarian intervention.    
  Another central component to peacekeeping is the consent of governments, or relevant 
institutions, to the presence of external forces.  This approach respects the sovereignty of nations 
and state institutions while still providing third party assistance and maintaining legitimacy.  
Included in this component of peacekeeping is impartiality and the refusal to support any one 
side in the conflict.  However, there are countless situations where a humanitarian intervention is 
desperately needed but the government in question is not willing to give consent.  Furthermore, 
in most conflict areas, the government in question directly participates in violent acts, further 
complicating a proper UN response.  Sovereignty is no longer completely sacrosanct, and 
overstepping it can be justified on legal and ethical grounds.  During interventions where there is 
no government consent, it may also be impossible to avoid inherently supporting one specific 
cause or group.  The most obvious limitation, and perhaps the most crucial, of peacekeeping is 
the involvement of military arms and the intention to use whatever force necessary.  Significant 
obstacles for early peacekeeping forces were the inability of UN troops to defend themselves and 
their failure to physically prevent violence from continuing, because of the lack of military 
means.  The ONUC mission was an early example of the difficulties of peacekeeping, wherein 
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even the largest UN force became overwhelmed with violent clashes, unable to defend itself or 
local citizens.49 
 In a report to the General Assembly in 1991, "secretary-general Javier Perez de Cuellar 
observed, ‘It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential 
domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human 
rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity.’"50 One of the first successful 
humanitarian interventions was operation Desert Storm in 1991, noted for its effectiveness and 
principled purpose. 51  The goal of Desert Storm was to dispel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Although perhaps not yet recognized under that name, humanitarian intervention became 
qualitatively different from peacekeeping following the Iraqi invasion in 1991. Then UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros -Ghali published a report in 1992 titled An Agenda for Peace: 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, which is credited with encouraging the 
international community to acknowledge the changes that have taken place since the end of the 
Cold War and adjust practices accordingly.  The report said that peacekeeping “might have to 
expand and develop in qualitatively new ways.”52  Throughout the rest of the 1990s and entering 
the 20th Century, it was clear that humanitarian intervention was emerging as a legitimate 
practice. 
 As previously mentioned, the ideological thaw that happened around 1991, after the fall of 
the Soviet Union, contributed greatly to ideal conditions for change.  The end of the Cold War 
"reenergized the United Nations as a major player in international relations."53  More resources 
were suddenly available to the UN 54 after the Cold War thaw and peacekeeping operations were 
able to expand.55  Aided by global discussion and increased awareness, legitimacy and 
acceptance of humanitarian intervention, authorized by the UN, grew.  The international 
community began working to "[align] the security interests of the strong and the weak at the 
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global level."56  Finding solutions to war and insecurity that were more beneficial for all nations, 
instead of just the powerful few, became a greater priority of the international community.  As 
states continued to recover from the Cold War years, and more international cooperation seemed 
possible, new ideas were emerging about humankind57 and what a united peoples might mean.  
There were no clear and immediate demarcations of alliances in the wake of the Cold War and 
ideas about a shared global society began to grow.  Alternatively, deadly humanitarian crises in 
the Third World, which might have been previously ignored due to Cold War tensions58, were 
now met with a greater potential for meaningful external action.  
 The maturation of peacekeeping and the expansion of UN activity following the end of the 
Cold War allowed for humanitarian intervention to become a legitimate practice.  Besides the 
fact that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine evolved out of intervention practices, its roots are 
also closely intertwined with three different but equally important sources; the globally 
condemned humanitarian disasters of the 1990s, the advocacy of former Secretary General 
Annan, and the work in part of the Canadian government and its creation, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.  Post-Cold War, many nationalist and ethnic 
conflicts flared in former communist countries, and the African continent has been consistently 
plagued by famines and instability.59  A series of deadly wars and crises brought the issue of 
humanitarianism to the forefront of global politics during the 1990s.  In 1992 and 1993, botched 
humanitarian efforts to remedy the failing political and social systems in Somalia ended in an 
embarrassing, bloody exit for the Americans.  Eighteen US soldiers were killed in Somalia and 
one body was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, resulting in the US and the UN 
promptly pulling out of the region.60  This infamous “Black Hawk Down”61 incident provided a 
foundation for a mistrust of intervention and a hesitation to risk lives that proved detrimental to 
later conflicts in the decade.  A prolonged civil war still paralyzes the country.  Subsequent 
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conflicts proved to the international community that a re-examination of global humanitarian 
norms was necessary. 
 Shortly after Somalia, a brutal campaign of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 horrified the 
international community and brought the issue of humanitarian intervention to the forefront.  
Despite early warning signs of coming violence, the United Nations made virtually no attempt to 
quell the massacre.  The world watched as Tutsis were slaughtered by ethnic Hutus in a 
coordinated campaign to eliminate the Tutsi population.62   Fuelled by years of ethnic tension 
and inequality, the genocide in Rwanda was one of the most universally reviled experiences 
since the Holocaust, ending with 800,000 dead.63  Almost an entire generation of a cultural group 
was wiped out and there is a great amount of speculation whether it was preventable, or that at 
the very least, there could have been a significantly greater effort to quell the genocidal violence.  
The Rwandan genocide was an unfortunate event which turned out to be of vital importance for 
the development of humanitarian intervention thought.  If the genocide in Rwanda was not 
enough to force the international community to discuss new ideas about humanitarianism, the 
brutal wars in the Balkans reinforced the importance of the issue. 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of former Yugoslavia resulted in 
several violent civil wars and ethnicity-fuelled territorial disputes.  The reputation of the United 
Nations was tarnished by its lack of adequate action and ability to quell the fighting.  Bosnia-
Herzegovina was sharply divided into regions controlled respectively by Croatians, Bosnian 
Muslims, and Serbians.  From 1992 to1993, these groups carried out brutal campaigns of ethnic 
cleansing of minorities within their respective territories.  In1995, the UN-designated safe haven 
for Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica was infiltrated and overrun by Serbian forces, resulting in a 
massacre of 7,000 people in full view of the inadequate United Nations peacekeeping forces.  In 
the hotly contested region of Kosovo, ethnic tension began in 1993 and intensified in 1998.  
Serbian forces began a violent crackdown on Kosovo rebels and in 1999 a NATO-led 
intervention attempted to broker the situation.  NATO allies began a relentless bombing 
campaign that resulted in the destruction of buildings and homes, created countless refugees, and 
caused hundreds of civilian deaths.  The United Nations involvement in the Balkans during this 
decade has been described as “a spectacular setback” and “collective spinelessness” in a period 
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of “horrendous failures.”64  Although these crises were stains on the UN's humanitarian legacy, 
they illuminated the need for change in international relations.  No one was more aware o f the 
change that needed to happen than UN Secretary General of the time, Kofi Annan.  
 Former Secretary General Annan was the loudest advocate of greater action by the United 
Nations to prevent humanitarian atrocities, like the ones that occurred during his term.  One of 
Annan’s principal concerns was the functioning of the United Nations Security Council and its 
difficulty coming to timely and appropriate decisions.  The Secretary General became very vocal 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s about the inhumanity of the genocide and ethnic cleansing 
that was occurring under his watch.  He attempted to engage the Security Council in thoughtful 
discussion.  He challenged the Security Council, as well as the wider international community, to 
work to avoid “future Kosovos,” in which the UNSC was deadlocked about whether or not to 
intervene to prevent a crisis from getting worse, and “future Rwandas,” where member states 
lacked the political will to take decisive action in the face of genocide and other humanitar ian 
atrocities.65  In his 2000 Millennium report, Annan addressed the issue of sovereignty directly in 
his challenge to the UN Security Council: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to 
gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity?”66  Kofi was later the champion of the R2P doctrine, after it had been developed by 
the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty.   
 
 R2P and Global Acceptance 
 
 In response to UN Secretary General Annan's calls for change, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was formed.  The purpose of the ICISS was 
to hold a discussion about humanitarian intervention,  including when and how to intervene and 
how to prevent the occurrence of further mass atrocities. 67  Former Canadian Foreign Affairs 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy helped the Canadian government establish the ICISS in 2001, and 
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served as the chair of the Advisory Board.  The three goals of the Commission were to promote 
comprehensive debate about intervention, foster a new consensus on how to reconcile 
intervention and sovereignty, and translate consensus into action.68   These goals confirm the 
commitment of the United Nations to continue redefining the parameters of peacekeeping 
following the rise of intra-state conflicts after the Cold War years.  Professionals, academics, 
intellectuals, and experts on the subject from across the globe, including notable scholars like 
Ramesh Thakur and Michael Ignatieff, came together to “wrestle with the whole gamut of 
difficult and complex issues involved in the debate.”69  These issues included,  
the tension in principle between sovereignty and intervention, the divergent interests and 
perspectives in political practice...evolving norms and state practice with respect to peace 
and security... [and] the relationship[s] between force and diplomacy, human rights and 
international security, national security and human security, [and] the UN and the USA.70 
The 'right' of intervention, or,  
 the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive - and in particular 
 military - action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that 
 other state,71 
was also central to the ICISS discussions.  Focusing on the idea of a 'responsibility' to intervene 
instead of a 'right' would ideally center discussion on the needs of those suffering humanitarian 
abuse rather than the rights of those considering military action.  It was clear that non-
interventionism, originating from historical conceptions of statehood, was no longer sufficient 
for modern global society.  Simon Adams argues that today, governments no longer challenge 
the idea that "the international community has an obligation to assist a state if it is struggling to 
protect its people."72  The R2P doctrine was formed into a concept that would ideally “impose 
upon the United Nations an obligation to shield people all over the world from genocide and 
ethnic cleansing at the hands of their own governments.”73   
                                                 
68
 Council on Foreign Relations, "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: Responsibility to 
Protect Report,"  Council on Foreign Relat ions, December 2001,  http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-
intervention/international-commission-intervention-state-sovereignty-responsibility-protect-report/p24228.  
69
 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to 
Protect, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),  247. 
70
 Ibid, 245.   
71
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,  "The Responsibility to Protect."   
72
 Simon Adams, "The 'Responsibility to Protect' at 10," E-International Relations, March 29, 2015,  http://www.e-
ir.info/2015/03/29/ r2p-at-10/.    
73
 Luiza CH. Savage, “Canada’s ‘responsibility to protect’ Doctrine Gaining Ground at the UN,” The Canadian 
Encyclopedia, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/macleans/canadas-responsibility-to-protect-
doctrine-gaining-ground-at-the-un.  
  
20 
 
 The Canadian ambassador to the United Nations at the time R2P was created, Allan Rock, 
was largely responsible for pushing the newly conceptualized doctrine onto the UN agenda.  He 
urged his colleagues to consider if they would, "rather live in a world in which [the] power [to 
intervene and stop atrocities] is there but there are no rules to define how it’s used? Or [would 
they prefer a world] where there are clear rules governing its exercise, and [they] can participate 
in developing those rules?”74  Kofi Annan wholeheartedly embraced the idea of international 
responsibility and championed its becoming official UN policy.  Although the R2P doctrine was 
controversial at first, the international community began to embrace it.  Not long after the ICISS 
published The Responsibility to Protect report, Secretary General Annan convened the High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to report on how the United Nations should 
confront current and upcoming security threats in the 21st century.75  The report it published, 
entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, endorsed the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine in its entirety, setting out guidelines for its use.  The report recommended that the R2P 
doctrine be adopted into UN law to serve as a legitimate authorization of force for humanitarian 
intervention.   Kofi Annan confirmed his approval for R2P in an additional report published in 
2005 entitled In Larger Freedom,76 which also served as a basis for the agenda of the UN World 
Summit that same year, where R2P was unanimously adopted.  
 There were mixed reviews about the achievements of the World Summit, which has been 
criticised for failing in its original mandate to address the progress of the Millennium 
Development Goals.77  Many world leaders and state representatives to the United Nations were 
also disappointed by an overloaded agenda and a lack of tangible progress. 78  However, the 
United Nations General Assembly ultimately took a unified stance on all aspects of the outcome 
document and the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was described as definitive, 
historic, 79 and a considerable step forward.80  The minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech 
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Republic stated that the "renewed commitments...to the Responsibility to Protect brought new 
hope to those facing lawlessness and oppression," while the Australian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs praised the Summit for having "embodied a historic shift in mindset on human rights and 
the collective responsibility to protect human beings."81  Nicola Reindorp, head of Oxfam in 
New York, congratulated world leaders on the decision to protect civilians: "After each genocide 
in the past world leaders have said 'never again;' now, at last, the world has agreed that 'never 
again' should mean 'never again,' and this could help make tragedies like the Rwandan genocide 
a thing of the past."82    Since 2005, the R2P doctrine has been reaffirmed in resolutions 1674 in 
2006 and 1894 in 2009.  Resolution 1894 also established a Joint Office between the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Special Adviser to the Secretary General with a 
focus on R2P, with the purposes of "conduct[ing] independent early-warning assessment, 
build[ing] system-wide capacity related to [R2P], and help[ing] develop common policy on 
[R2P] situations."83   
 During the years following the World Summit, global endorsements of the Responsibility 
to Protect doctrine increased.  Despite critiques of the doctrine's practical implementation, as will 
be examined in Chapter Two, the Responsibility to Protect is largely unques tioned in theory.  
Maggie Powers used detailed text analysis software to conduct a study of 3,159 UNSC and 
Human Rights Council (HRC) documents, from 2006 to 2013, to analyze "how often, when, and 
by whom R2P terminology has been referenced over time at the UN."84  The study concludes 
that even amidst the backlash following the Libyan intervention in 2011, the integration of the 
Responsibility to Protect into UN discourse has expanded, and "R2P has become further 
internalised and is increasingly utilised in the Security Council and Human Rights Council". 85  
The analysis shows that post-Libya, official state approval of the R2P principles has grown and 
references to the doctrine in UN documents increased from under 500 in 2005 to over 1500 in 
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2013.86  David Gethings, an international conflict management professor, argues that the 
Responsibility to Protect has evolved alongside modern cosmopolitanism to redefine and 
promote civic engagement, giving "human rights and international law a new form of 
accountability and enforcement."87   In their article on the World Summit and the trajectory of 
the R2P doctrine, Murthy and Kurtz label Responsibility to Protect a 'landmark agreement,' and 
write that it is as widely accepted by the international community in 2015 as it was in 2005.88  
Murthy and Kurtz argue that the R2P doctrine has become associated with international 
solidarity and that has contributed to its increased global acceptance.  At the very least, the 
Responsibility to Protect has encouraged discussion about international humanitarianism.  Sassan 
Gholiagha argues that the adoption of R2P has created an atmosphere in international relations 
that is conducive to "a politics of protection aimed at individual beings."89  
 Ten years after its official adoption, Simon Adams, the Executive Director for the Global 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, argues that because of the acceptance of R2P since it 
was created,  there is no longer any question as to its legitimacy.  He states that, "This is now an 
uncontroversial idea.  The challenge is implementation."90  The United Nations is the highest 
international authority on the use of military force, boasting universal membership and a 
representative General Assembly.91  Its adoption of the Responsibility to Protect gives the 
doctrine international legitimacy and legality.  However, the legality of the Responsibility to 
Protect is fundamentally rooted in international law, based in the United Nations Charter.   
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International Legality 
 
 As will be discussed further in Chapter Two, R2P and humanitarian intervention have been 
labelled by many scholars as illegitimate in international affairs ,92 in part because not all 
countries subscribe to their principles and not all humanitarian norms are shared. 93  Many 
questions about its legality also stem from the Charter of the United Nations, signed on June 26, 
1945.  According to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, "All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations."94 Article 2(4), according to J. E. Linter, is "an agreed cornerstone of customary 
international law regarding the use of force," that super-cedes any pre-existing international 
norms.95  China has publicly stated its opposition to intervention and the reinvention of state 
sovereignty.   
"[T]he implementation of "R2P" [the responsibility to protect] should not contravene the 
principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non- interference of internal affairs [of 
States].  Although the world has undergone complex and profound changes...[t]here must 
not be any wavering over the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference 
of internal affairs."96 
Linter argues that there is currently very little international legislation which supports the legality 
of humanitarian intervention and that the "principle of sovereignty continues to have universal 
precedence over human rights."97  Milena Sterio, a global expert on international law, also 
acknowledges that legal restraint on military intervention is a foundation holding up the global 
system.  "The prohibition on the use of force is a basic norm of international law,"98 writes 
Sterio.    
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Under the Charter, nations agreed...to forego the use of external force to change the political 
status quo.  Nations would be assured their fundamental independence, the enjoyment of 
their territory, their freedom - a kind of right to be let alone.99   
This prohibition on the use of force internationally, however, comes from a more traditional, 
possibly outdated, conception of state sovereignty.  Linter argues that at the very least, 
humanitarian intervention can be morally legitimate, under certain ethical conditions (to be 
discussed further in this chapter), even if it is internationally illegal.100    
 There is significant consensus on the illegality of unilateral intervention,101 as Article 2(4) 
outlaws the use of force on the part of individual states alone.  The Charter does instead 
empower the Security Council to make all decisions on collective measures that involve military 
force.102  Ian Hurd, an international law scholar and Director of the International Studies 
Program at Northwestern University, writes that it is impossible to conclude whether 
humanitarian intervention is legal or illegal because Article 2(4) of the charter is in direct 
conflict with modern international norms on intervention.  However, because of developments in 
state practice and norms since 1945, he acknowledges that there is a legal case to be made for 
humanitarian intervention under certain perceptions of international law and in certain crisis 
situations.103  In fact, there are many elements of current international relations that help define 
"the legal conditions under which states can use force against others," and the "legal environment 
in which war is conducted," including treaties like the Genocide Convention and the idea of 
universal human rights. 104  This idea will expanded on later in this chapter.  A.P.V. Rogers 
argues that it is possible for the United Nations Charter, and other aspects of internationa l law, to 
be modified over time by repetitive and persistent state practice.  Rogers believes that state 
actions contrary to traditional international law can over time become legitimate norms, "by the 
congruent practice of the member states crystallizing as new principles of customary law,"105 
making it possible for humanitarian intervention to eventually become legal.     
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 A.O. Enabulele  also writes about the legitimisation of norms through custom.   In the 
International Journal of Human Rights, he argues that "Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) clearly itemised the applicable international law to include: 
customary international law and conventions."106  Customary international law is,  
unwritten and derives from the actual practice of Nations over time.  To be accepted as law, 
the custom must be long standing, widespread and practiced in a consistent and uniform way 
among Nations...and followed as a matter of legal obligation [under] opinio juris. "107 
Enabulele doubts the existence of long standing applicable state practice and believes that the 
majority of 'humanitarian interventions' have been undertaken with self-motivated intent, 
denoting the absence of true opinio juris.108  However, Rogers argues that UN missions in 
Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq in 1991, and Kosovo in 1999109 all helped the evolution of 
international norms and international law by establishing normative state practice.  Although 
these interventions were not necessarily undertaken with a "legal right of humanitarian 
intervention" they were tolerated by the international community. 110   
 The authors of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine also write about the evolution of 
international law.  The doctrine states that the current debate on humanitarian intervention "takes 
place in a historical, political and legal context of evolving international standards of conduct for 
states and individuals, including the development of new and stronger norms and mechanisms 
for the protection of human rights."111  Chelsea O'Donnell writes in the Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law that although it is still only in the most extreme 
circumstances, the Security Council's capacity to authorize humanitarian interventions should be 
"definitively established in [customary international law]" because of historical state practice of 
intervention, the international acceptance of human rights, and documented agreement by the 
United Nations of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 112  Thus, "the responsibility to protect 
should act as an effective legal tool to prevent atrocities."113 
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  Ultimately, the legal argument for intervention is based within the UN Charter itself.  
Sterio writes that, "international law, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, prohibits states 
from using force against other states except in two situations: pursuant to the Security Council 
authorization or in self-defense."114  Under these two conditions, military force can be justified.  
Furthermore, Article 2 of the Charter outlaws intervening in matters within the "domestic 
jurisdiction of any state," but adds, "this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.115  Chapter VII, Article 39, states that,  
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.116  
Sterio argues that there is a "persuasive" case to be made that "severe human rights abuses have 
destabilising repercussions that are not confined to an individual state," and as such "severe 
human rights abuse [can constitute] a threat to international peace and security."117  Therefore, 
Article 41 empowers the Security Council to,  
Decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect 
to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures.  These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, seas, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations.118 
Article 42 goes further and clearly states that UN actions to maintain peace and security may 
include military force if necessary;    
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of Members of the United Nations.119 
The UN Charter has been a legally binding document to all members of the United Nations since 
its creation.  When authorized by the Security Council, humanitarian intervention has a legal 
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basis under Chapter VII.  Although there are still contrasting interpretations of which articles 
take precedence, the evolution of global norms continually point to the fact that, in some 
situations, Chapter VII of the Charter outweighs the primacy of state sovereignty.      
 The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention also stems from internationally accepted 
social norms that support intervention on the basis of morality.  Universal human rights, which 
essentially links all humanity together,120 is one of these norms.  The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in 1948.121  
This declaration, in effect, "challenged the presumption of sovereign state reason," and instead 
deemed the human person "in collective and private life...to have rights rooted in inalienable 
dignity and intrinsic worth that existed prior to the state and were independent of anything 
conferred in its gift."122  Consequently, human rights are, in theory, inviolable and shared by all 
groups of people across the planet.  If a population has a government that is not respecting 
human rights, then it is an injustice against citizens of the earth, not just citizens of Sierra Leone 
or Sudan.  The mass atrocities that the world has seen, if only in the past two decades, have 
caused a moral outrage in the international community 123 and intervention has become more 
easily justifiable.  During the crisis in Rwanda in 1994, the Security Council and the rest of the 
international community watched as 800,000 Tutsis were murdered over a four month period.  
The Rwandan crisis generated support for a standing UN military force,124 available for quick 
response to similar crises.  It is also a reminder that if United Nations members are committed to 
human rights and international peace and security, then they must be prepared to validate that 
commitment through appropriate action and prevention.  The UN Secretary General constantly 
reminds the international community that the promise of 'never again' following the Rwandan 
genocide needs to be more purposefully upheld.125   
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 Terry Nardin, Head of the Political Science Department at the National University of 
Singapore, argues that the moral imperative for intervention goes back much farther than modern 
international law and that the “use of force is justified not only in self-defense but also to punish 
wrongs and protect the innocent.”126  He maintains that there is “natural law,”127 understood by 
all humanity, that is binding without written law.  "Natural law," Nardin writes, "is the most 
important class of universally enforceable laws...understood as comprising precepts that can be 
known by reason and are binding on all rational beings."128  The basis of a natural law, with 
respect to humanitarian intervention, rests on the idea of a common morality between people.  
This common morality prohibits causing harm to one another and promotes actions to avenge or 
punish wrongdoing.  On a global scale, a natural law would allow punitive actions against 
communities or states that are abusing citizens or permitting wrongs to be done. 129  Humanitarian 
intervention "is a response to grave human rights violations, and the most basic human rights are 
universal moral rights - rights...that rest on the principles of common morality."130  In theory, 
there is a higher moral responsibility for nations to intervene than that which is authorized by 
international law.  Although natural law is unquestionably broad and does not adequately 
account for all the complexities of modern international relations, it demonstrates an inherent 
‘rightness’ that often exists for decision making.  
 According to Michael Walzer, a social contract also exists between governments and their 
citizens.  Walzer argues that the right to self-determination and self-governance are void when a 
government “turns savagely upon its own people.”131  Walzer questions the basic existence of a 
legitimate political community under these circumstances.132  In the event that this contract 
between government and citizens is breeched by abuse in the form of a humanitarian disaster, a 
state relinquishes its right to sovereignty and there are therefore no restraints to intervention.  
Subsequently, the international community must provide external assistance to maintain the 
strength and survival of the oppressed group.133  A government holds the legitimate authority in a 
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recognized state and also has the right to be sovereign in the international system, but what 
upholds that authority is responsibility and accountability to a population.  Citizens of every 
country should have the right to live freely without being oppressed, harmed, or killed by their 
government.  If such a violation of humanity occurs then, according to the existing social 
contract, a government waives its right to sovereignty.    
 Fernando R. Tesón (2006) outlines eight principles for humanitarian intervention.134  He 
states that humanitarian intervention is necessary and justifiable when undertaken with these 
ethical and moral standards in mind.  According to these principles, governments derive 
legitimacy from citizens and forfeit their right to sovereignty when they abuse their authority to 
govern.  The principles also state that universal human rights exist and the international 
community has an obligation to either uphold them or intervene.  The principles further include: 
a just cause for military action, the respect of negative repercussions and the minimization of 
casualties during an operation, the requirement of a severe level of violence before intervention, 
the necessity of targets welcoming intervention, and the importance of the legitimacy of 
intervention in the international arena.135  This list addresses some of the main issues involved in 
arguments both for and against intervention, including the issue of sovereignty, the problem of 
casualties, and the abuse of power.  The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is also based on 
similar ethical and moral principles.  It focuses on the idea of human rights as internationally 
binding and redefines how humanitarian intervention should be perceived.  The main conclusion 
from Tesón's work is that intervention is a justifiable undertaking, but should address these 
principles as guidelines.  In all, an ethical and moral case can be made for military humanitarian 
intervention, under the proper authority of the United Nations, in cases where governments are 
allowing humanitarian atrocities to be committed.    
 To summarize, there is a strong case to be made that humanitarian intervention is a legal, 
ethically legitimate, and internationally accepted practice.  The R2P doctrine and humanitarian 
intervention are legal under the UN Charter, although there are contradictory interpretations of 
sovereignty in Chapters I and VII.  Chapter VII states clearly that the Security Council may 
authorize any use of military force necessary to maintain international peace and security.  The 
evolution of intervention norms has also helped to legitimize humanitarian intervention.  
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Humanitarian intervention has been extensively defended as ethically and morally justifiable and 
it has been widely accepted by the international community and the United Nations.  The 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine was adopted in 2005 and has been reaffirmed by the United 
Nations in several resolutions over the past decade.  As experts have continually confirmed, the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine is no longer a debated concept; the difficulties lie in the 
practical application of humanitarian intervention. 
 It is essential for the international community to continue debating the theory and practical 
application of humanitarian intervention, as even legitimate uses of force can have extreme 
consequences.  Furthermore, human rights become more applicable on a universal scale if 
humanitarian intervention is internationally legitimate.  The western liberal conception of human 
rights may not be universally accepted, but with the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, the 
international community has confirmed that humanitarian atrocities are unacceptable.  There has 
been a shift in favour of humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War and the R2P 
doctrine has become a significant part of that change.  Humanitarianism and solidarity are deeply 
entrenched concepts for the United Nations and the foundational  principles of the Responsibility 
to Protect have been almost universally accepted.  However, just because a humanitarian 
intervention may be necessary does not mean that it will be successful.  Furthermore, the 
Security Council is not always the most efficient international actor, military campaigns do not 
always stop intrastate violence and UN-authorized interventions are not always received by local 
citizens as legitimate or benevolent.  The Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been adopted by 
the United Nations, but humanitarian interventions remain very complex and unpredictable.  
Chapter Two will discuss many of the issues still facing humanitarian intervention and the 
further implementation of the R2P doctrine.           
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Chapter 2 Opposition Theory and The Constraints of the Contemporary System 
 
 The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is valuable as a concept of change for 
humanitarian intervention but there are still political and logistical challenges which could 
prevent its further integration as an international norm by the UN.  Numerous scholars, 
politicians, and international actors oppose humanitarian intervention and the basic principles of 
R2P on a foundational level.  Not only is there theoretical opposition to humanitarian 
intervention, but difficulties are also evident during practical implementation.  Some obstacles 
are situational.  National interests and definitional language change depending on the crisis.  
Other challenges, like the strong Chinese and Russian support for sovereignty, are permanent 
fixtures of  international relations.  Many of the difficulties involved in implementing R2P are 
permanent fixtures of the international system and can only be partially mitigated.  However, 
analyzing these difficulties could attempt to explain the Security Council's authorization of 
humanitarian interventions and further evaluate the true potential of R2P.   
 
In Opposition to Humanitarian Intervention and R2P 
 
 One of the first arguments against intervention is that it violates the sovereignty of nation 
states, when carried out without the consent of the government in question.  The modern global 
system of cooperating states was essentially founded on the principle of respecting sovereignty, 
and international relations today still depends on it.  The UN General Assembly’s 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States affirms that, “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”136  
Despite updates to this principle, there is still a clear basis within the United Nations that 
prohibits interference in the affairs of other states.  Sovereignty has continuously presented 
challenges to humanitarian intervention since the introduction of peacekeeping.  It is one of the 
main reasons that peacekeeping was originally created to be a neutral and impartial action with 
the consent of the governing parties in question. 
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 Sovereignty is an international concept that is as essential to global cooperation as it is to 
the discussion of humanitarian intervention.  Mark Amstutz writes that sovereignty is “the most 
fundamental pillar of international society” and states have a duty to respect the political and 
territorial integrity of other states.137  Several countries that hold important positions in the UN 
Security Council are very persistent in upholding sovereignty as an inviolable principle, and as 
such the outside interference in another state’s affairs is an inappropriate action.  Because in 
practice sovereignty is not necessarily inviolable anymore, as documented interventions show, 
comprehensive agreement on the subject is still difficult to achieve.  The acceptance of 
legitimate intervention and the overstepping of sovereignty, even on humanitarian grounds, can 
arguably lead to a destabilization of the global system or abuse by world powers. 
 Along similar lines, John Stuart Mill would argue that the right to self-determination 
should exist for all nations and people, but inherent in that is the right to self determine without 
external involvement.  Mill advocates that members of a particular political community need to 
“seek their own freedom, just as the individual must cultivate his own virtue.  They cannot be set 
free, as [the individual] cannot be made virtuous, by any external force.”138  For Mill, nations 
must choose their own fate and either live within the existing parameters or collectively and 
purposefully change them.  Along with the inherent right to self defence comes the inherent law 
that people must create their own society;139 peace and good governance imposed on a 
population is not peace or good governance at all, rather a false blanket of values that are not 
engrained.   Furthermore, when prescribing to these views, it is not the business of the 
international community what type of government is operating in any other country or even the 
extent to which atrocities are occurring there.  Based on Mill's conception of international 
relations, both the sanctity of sovereignty and the right of self-determination should prevent a 
state from interfering in the affairs of another state.  
 A further argument against humanitarian intervention assumes that it can make a situation 
worse and aggravate tensions to a more extreme level.  Unintended violence, innocent casualties, 
and feelings of hatred towards the intervener can be created even with a justifiable cause.  After 
Operation Restore Hope commenced in Somalia in 1992 in response to widespread famine and 
political anarchy, the UN peacekeeping mission UNOSOM II took over.  Authorized by the 
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Security Council to consolidate and maintain a secure environment throughout Somalia, 
UNOSOM II eventually became embroiled in a deadly conflict with local forces under the 
control of warlord General Mohammad Farrah Aideed. 140  The conflict raged for four months, 
eventually killing eighteen US soldiers, injuring seventy-eight, and killing or injuring between 
five hundred and one thousand Somalis.141  Many opponents to intervention point to examples 
like this and even the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, although not humanitarian 
interventions, to illustrate the dangers of a foreign military presence.  Indeed, there is a solid case 
to be made that western interventions in Middle Eastern and North African countries have only 
exacerbated political unrest and infused anti-American hatred into much of society there.  
 A final important argument in opposition to humanitarian intervention, although there are 
many other moral, ethical, and legal considerations, is that it is very costly in monetary and 
casualty terms.  Any military action, whether or not it is just, has an elevated chance of causing 
civilian and UN casualties.  Additionally, the loss of lives from intervening countries is always 
controversial for UN member states.  Cost-benefit analysis of lives lost does not always appear to 
benefit a state when the outcome is peace in another part of the world.  However, national 
interest is not a morally unjust concept, as every state has a right to use its resources wisely and 
as it sees fit.  Additionally, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are expensive.  
Although each member state of the United Nations has a responsibility to contribute a certain 
amount to the organization, there are still extra funds required for interventions. Benjamin A. 
Valentino reveals that the cost of the US intervention in Somalia was more than $7 billion, 142 and 
that is only one small example among many interventions by the United States alone.  It is 
expensive for individual countries to undertake intervention operations.  In addition, is the fact 
that the United Nations Security Council holds the only legitimate power to authorize 
intervention and there is often a lack of funds and forces to intervene.  If the United Nations does 
not have the capabilities or finances to intervene successfully then many would argue against 
intervention.  Not only is it costly in terms of lives, but it is costly monetarily, and economics is a 
major factor in the stability of the international system.  
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 Besides the fact that humanitarian intervention is a highly contested concept, the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine has drawn separate criticism for its projected and practiced 
utility in international affairs.  Since the Responsibility to Protect was officially adopted in 2005, 
practical implementation of its principles, including explicit references to the doctrine as grounds 
for humanitarian intervention, essentially remains limited to the 2011 intervention in Libya.  
Despite "violent internal conflicts" in both South Sudan and the Central African Republic in 
2013, Spencer Zifcak argues that the United Nations "failed in its sincere but flawed endeavours 
to stop the criminal violence" and "international crimes continued unabated."143  The failure of 
the Security Council to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises following the Libyan 
intervention is commonly attributed to "buyer's regret."144  The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa) "perceived the military action [undertaken in Libya] as having 
exceeded the mandate the Security Council had agreed upon...the BRICS nations have since 
remained firm in their opposition to military intervention."145  The ongoing unrest in Syria is also 
a globally recognized humanitarian crisis which remains unresolved after the adoption of the 
R2P doctrine and the Libyan intervention.  In spite of a death toll of over 300, 000 people, and 
evidence of chemical weapons attacks on suburbs in Damascus, there has yet to be any definitive 
intervention on behalf of the innocent civilians caught in the conflict. 146  Intervention in Syria 
would be very challenging because of the numerous warring rebel groups and factions, the fact 
that all parties involved have been accused of war crimes, and the UN's inability to decide on an 
appropriate group to support.147  However, the war in Syria is a terrible humanitarian crisis and 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was created to safeguard the international community from 
crises.  Some would argue that after its adoption,   
R2P did not become an effective means of mobilising political will or effective action on a 
case-by-case basis. Essentially, effective instances of mobilisation relied mostly on the 
notion of genocide itself as well as on parallels to the cases of Rwanda and Srebrenica, while 
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the discourse of R2P did little to alleviate the political and practical obstacles to effective 
implementation of the common intent to protect people from mass atrocities. 148 
Much of the disparagement of the normative potential of R2P principles stems from unresolved 
conflicts and perceived inaction. 
 Another significant criticism of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is the fact that the 
R2P report given to the UN by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty in 2001 was scaled back considerably before it became the actual doctrine that was 
adopted in 2005. Several key areas of the original ICISS document were significantly changed 
because of disagreements in the international community and the biases of members of the 
Security Council.  The initial R2P doctrine stated that: 
The responsibility to protect transfers to the international community when the state 
involved is unable or unwilling to look after its citizens’ human rights [and that] military 
intervention will meet the just cause threshold in circumstances of ‘serious and irreparable 
harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur’ and, in particular, actual or 
apprehended ‘large-scale loss of life’ or ‘large-scale ethnic cleansing’ (ICISS, 2001 a: 
XII).149 
It is clear in the original wording of the doctrine that if a serious humanitarian situation is even 
just likely to occur, or a state is unwilling to perform its duties, the international community – as 
represented by the United Nations – is obligated to step in.  However, in the doctrine accepted at 
the UN World Summit, the responsibility to protect citizens only transfers to the UN when 
“national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations”150 and military 
intervention will meet the just cause threshold only in the more limited circumstances of 
"genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."151  Although semantic 
changes may not seem substantial, minor differences to policy can have a large influence on its 
practical implementation.  This adjustment of the original R2P draft diminishes the ability of the 
United Nations to effectively prevent imminent crises under the auspices of R2P and instead 
encourages a more conservative and circumspect role for the UN. 
 One additional difference between the original draft of the R2P doctrine and the document 
adopted by the United Nations, is the conception of the legitimate authority to respond to 
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humanitarian crises.  The ICISS doctrine asserted that the Security Council is the foremost body 
responsible for responding to humanitarian emergencies but leaves room for “alternative sources 
of authority (such as the Uniting for Peace procedure).”152  In the event that the Security Council 
is failing in its responsibility to uphold international peace and security, the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution authorizes the General Assembly to instead make recommendations for the use of 
armed forces.  The original version of the Responsibility to Protect was focused on the urgency 
of responding to humanitarian crises even when the Security Council was unable to agree upon a 
course of action.  The R2P doctrine that has been officially adopted is more conservative and 
restricts the capabilities of the UN to intervene.  The doctrine still emphasizes responding to 
crises, but clearly states that “any action is to be collective and to be taken through the Security 
Council [only].”153 
 R2P has also been condemned for its potential to be abused to further national and 
geopolitical interests.  Kurtz and Rotmann claim, "neither do the existing language [of R2P] and 
its limited weight exert much pressure on countries to enable effective action, nor does the 
language of R2P sufficiently shield it from abuse for purposes other than protection.154  In her 
article on atrocity prevention under R2P, Deborah Mayersen argues that the language and 
principles of the Responsibility to Protect are patronizing and imply that the states in question 
cannot find ways to resolve their own problems.  She believes that the R2P doctrine focuses 
solely on the need for the international community to respond to humanitarian crises, ignoring 
the capacity for self-determination of individual states.  Mayerson argues that if this 
condescending mindset continues to empower strong states, it will promote  international abuse 
of the R2P doctrine and the imposition of political will by powerful countries. 155  This critique of 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has also been fuelled by the aftermath of the Libyan 
intervention.  As previously mentioned, the BRICS nations have become increasingly distrustful 
of interventions and the strategic interests of the West.  Following the overthrow of the Libyan 
government, NATO was accused of abusing its power and using the R2P doctrine as a front to 
pursue national interests in the region.  "There was such consensus when the Security Council, 
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specifically invoking R2P, authorized military action in Libya in March 2011,  but it fell apart 
later in the year as the BRICS countries charged that the NATO-led forces had exceeded their 
civilian protection mandate."156  The original mandate of the Security Council resolution in 
Libya only authorized a no-fly zone.  However, NATO forces became more motivated by a 
desire for eventual regime change and further violence continued to tear apart Libya, causing 
major regret and skepticism by many nations.  Preventing further abuse of power by Western 
nations, in the form of illegitimate intervention, has become a top priority for the BRICS.  The 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine was intended to focus humanitarian intervention on the rights 
of the suffering over the rights of the international community to intervene, but this has been 
somewhat forgotten amidst the controversy over the Libyan crisis.  
 Louise Arbour, former Canadian Supreme Court justice and former president o f the 
International Crisis Group, writes that not only is there a possibility of some states abusing the 
Responsibility to Protect, but that the whole system of international law, human-rights promotion 
and intervention is detrimentally stalled.  Arbour believes that there is a total disconnect in "the 
promotion of what [the West] believes are universal values,"157 and how that is translated to the 
rest of the world.  In fact, she writes that "others don't take [the Western promotion of 
humanitarian values, including Western advocacy for the R2P doctrine] at face value as being a 
good-faith pursuit of universal goods."158  Furthermore, Arbour views the Responsibility to 
Protect as a failure because it ultimately proved ineffective in preventing a humanitarian disaster 
in Libya.  The creators of the Responsibility to Protect intended to prevent UN indecision during 
humanitarian crises, but the doctrine's use in Libya has resulted in a stalemate in the Security 
Council over future humanitarian interventions.  "[The imposition of R2P] by the UN in Libya, 
and the resulting chaos, severely crippled the notion of a legal intervention."159 Louise Fréchette, 
deputy secretary-general of the UN from 1998 to 2006, also argues that Western optimism over 
R2P and humanitarianism is misplaced.  She writes,  
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R2P is viewed with considerable suspicion in the developing world.  It is seen as a one-way 
street where rich and powerful countries have the right to come to the rescue of people in the 
south, but are free, themselves, from foreign intervention in their internal affairs.160    
Although both Arbour and Fréchette support the notion that "international relations should be 
guided by concerns for the welfare of human beings rather than the interests of states,"161 they 
are not convinced that the adoption of the R2P doctrine, or the evolution of humanitarian norms, 
have had a real impact in international relations.    
  
Systemic Constraints 
 
 In addition to the obstacles stemming from theoretical criticisms of the Responsibility to 
Protect, there are certain global norms and established facts about international relations that can 
interfere with how and when to intervene.  As previously examined, sovereignty and non-
interference in the affairs of other states is a consuming international issue.  Amstutz states that, 
“sovereignty and non- intervention must be honoured if order is to be maintained in global 
society.”162  Stability, in this case, depends on all states respecting others' boundaries and 
following the laws inherent in UN documents and the accepted international order.  Russia and 
China have consistently opposed calls for intervention.  For example, China abstained on voting 
for resolutions to authorize interventions in Haiti and Rwanda in 1994 163 and Russia called the 
NATO intervention in Yugoslavia a "major mistake in international relations and a violation of 
the founding principles of international law."164  Although neither stopped the Responsibility to 
Protect from being adopted in 2005, state sovereignty and non- intervention in international 
relations continue to be defining concepts for both countries. 165 
 China and Russia are two of the biggest constraints in the international system to the 
Responsibility to Protect and the concept of humanitarian intervention as a whole.  These two 
powerful states regularly advocate for the importance and inviolability of state sovereignty.  
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Russian and Chinese national interests are often at odds with the rest of the Security Council on 
important issues.  This western and non-western divide has been carried over from the Cold War, 
grew throughout the early 2000s, and was strengthened during the American ‘War on Terror.’166  
Several other countries with rotating membership in the Security Council and members of the 
UN General Assembly also regularly support non- intervention.  Most recently, Brazil, India, and 
Germany joined in abstaining from approving the intervention in Libya.  These countries 
abstained from the resolution because of its indeterminate language and perceived low chance of 
success,167 but also because of an underlying mistrust of R2P principles which could severely 
undermine sovereignty in developing countries.168  Every member of the United Nations has 
national interests which can often dilute impartial decision making, even in situations of extreme 
humanitarian need.  Of the UN members that oppose R2P and the intervention in Libya, Russia 
and China have the loudest objections and the greatest power to affect decision making because 
of their status as permanent members of the Security Council.  The divide over whether and 
under what circumstances there is a right to intervene was addressed by the ICISS169 during its 
discussion of humanitarian intervention.  However, legitimate interventions remain a very 
contentious issue. 
 The Russian opposition to humanitarian intervention has been at times both defensible and 
contradictory.  Both China and Russia are well known to oppose policies which might legitimize 
outside interference into their domestic affairs.  Reasons for resistance to interventions often 
include innate fear of an inability to control the use of force by other member states and the 
objection to anything not well defined, documented, or explicitly legitimized by the UN 
Charter.170  In terms of the Responsibility to Protect, Russia has taken a clear stance that 
adopting a doctrine like the Responsibility to Protect could potentially result in an overstepping 
of boundaries and a misuse of force.  Although Russia itself has referenced the Responsibility to 
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Protect as grounds for intervention in Georgia in 2008,171 a Russian delegate to the General 
Assembly warned against “taking rash and hasty steps to apply [the idea of R2P] arbitrarily to 
specific countries and against interpreting it too broadly....[which would be] counterproductive, 
but also dangerous in terms of harnessing international efforts to promote international peace and 
security.”172  In a meeting at the UN World Summit in 2005, where R2P was officially adopted 
as part of a report by the Secretary General, Russia reiterated its concern and distaste for change 
in this area.  Russian delegates denied that the Responsibility to Protect had widespread 
international support and stated rigidly that any decisions on intervention, even in cases of 
massive human rights violations, need to be authorized by the Security Council, establish that a 
relevant threat to the peace has occurred, and be based on reliable information. 173  The use of 
force must never be anything other than a last resort.174 
 China also stands beside Russia as one of the biggest constraints on the implementation of 
the R2P doctrine for the future.  Like Russia's, the Chinese government disagrees with the 
principles of the Responsibility to Protect and humanitarian intervention on a theoretical level, 
valuing sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-interference175 above all else.  Despite its ever 
growing interdependence and involvement in the global community, China is still vigilantly 
cautious about relinquishing too much authority and showing any subservience to the 
international community, preferring instead to maintain historical standards of practice.  
Although China officially accepted the need for the Responsibility to Protect in 2005, the 
Chinese made a point of insisting on keeping the scope of situations necessitating intervention 
very narrow.  As legitimate causes for intervention, under Security Council authority, China only 
accepts four specific cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic 
cleansing.176  These cases correspond with the Responsibility to Protect principles, but China still 
holds the belief that intervention is bad, counterproductive, and dangerous, 177 and that the UN 
Charter, as it was written at the creation of the United Nations, has no room for updated 
                                                 
171
 David Berman and Christopher Michaelsen, “Intervention in Libya: Another Nail in the Coffin for the 
Responsibility to Protect,” International Community Law Review 14(4) (2012): 346.  
172
 Ibid, 348.   
173
 United Nations, “87th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly,” (speeches presented at United Nations General 
Assembly meeting A/59/PV.87, New York, United States  of America, April, 2005). 
174
 Ibid.   
175
 Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, “W ill China Change the Rules of Global Order?” The Washington Quarterly 
33(4) (2010): 128.    
176
 Ibid, 130.   
177
 Ibid.   
  
41 
 
interpretations of policies that will encourage “wrongful interventions.”178  These constraints on 
the further evolution of humanitarian intervention and the integration of R2P are not unfamiliar, 
as there is rarely ever unanimous consensus on an important issue.  
 The United Nations is a large, multi- faceted, and very complex organization and as such 
has high operational costs.  The organization is made up of 193 member states and has six main 
organs (the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat)  which are 
further subdivided into subsidiary organs, funds and programmes, functional and regional 
commissions, specialized agencies, departments and offices, and other individual organizations 
and entities.  These bodies are tasked with maintaining international peace and security, 
promoting sustainable development, protecting human rights, delivering humanitarian aid, and 
upholding international law for the entire global community.  The UN's structural apparatus is 
complex and the practical application of all its operations combined with reaching consensus in 
the Security Council and passing a resolution can be very difficult.  Amassing sufficient funds 
and personnel also puts an extra strain on UN operations.  The UN high commissioner for 
refugees admits that some global problems today are surpassing the current capabilities of the 
UN.  "The [refugee] budgets cannot be compared with the growth in need.  Our income in 2015 
will be around 10% less than in 2014.  The global humanitarian community is not broken...But 
we are financially broke."179  This lack of funding is widespread across many agencies at the 
United Nations.  In humanitarian crisis zones, violence often continues unabated when there is 
not enough funding to support an intervention.180  Although the UN has updated its traditionally 
neutral peacekeeping strategies to properly address current global security concerns, the UN 
budget may not be able to keep up with the growing need for humanitarian operations. 
 Not only are funds not always readily available, but the complicated logistics of 
undertaking a humanitarian intervention can also be divisive and debilitating.  The challenges of 
determining when to intervene, how to intervene, and who will intervene are detrimental to quick 
and efficient decision-making.  As previously stated, according to the adopted principles of the 
R2P doctrine, for a humanitarian crisis to warrant UN intervention, a government must be 
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'manifestly failing' to protect its citizens and it must fall under the categories of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.   However, the characteristics which deem 
a crisis severe enough for a humanitarian intervention are still highly debated.  As will be 
discussed further in Chapter Three, unwillingness to intervene during the crisis in Darfur was 
fuelled in part by the absence of the use of the term 'genocide'.  Adrian Gallagher writes that, 
"little progress has been made over the last 10 years to clarify the ambiguity which surrounds the 
[R2P] requirement of a 'manifest failing'...this has fuelled recent concerns that pro- interventionist 
states may manipulate the ambiguity."181 
 Deciding on the proper military strategy also poses a challenge to implementing 
humanitarian interventions.  Civil wars and internal conflicts can be complicated, with a variety 
of agents involved, and it is not always clear which strategy will be the most successful.  In 
addition to political complications, the decision of whether or not to establish a no-fly in Syria 
was stalling UN action there after the conflict began in 2011.182  Lastly,  a humanitarian 
intervention cannot be successful without a properly trained military personnel.  The UN 
currently does not have a standing military force for interventions, inhibiting quick and effective 
action during humanitarian crises.  Member countries are all obligated to provide troops to carry 
out global operations.  Sometimes countries are unwilling to provide personnel from their own 
armies for UN operations, and often the most developed countries with the largest military 
budgets volunteer the least number of personnel.183  This gap in contributions is troubling and 
continues to be a challenge for the UN and future humanitarian interventions.                                     
 There is also an ongoing problem with the legitimacy of the UN and this affects through 
which channels nations are willing to go to have their needs met.  The UN "is the only truly 
global institution of a general purpose which approximates universality," and is "the closest we 
are able to get to an authentic voice of humanity."184  In reality, there are sometimes considerable 
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gaps and inconsistencies between the principles and practices of the UN.185  Many believe that 
the Security Council is grossly unrepresentative or that it is fundamentally corrupt as it will 
always cater to the needs of the five permanent members, despite the fact that there is rotating 
membership that includes all other nations in the General Assembly.  Ian Hurd argues that "the 
mismatch between the existing membership and the increasingly diverse population of states" 
stands to "delegitimatize" the Council.186  Hurd states that,  
The Council's legitimacy is in peril unless the body can be reformed to account for recent 
changes in world politics.  This consensus is driven by a number of developments: 
geopolitical changes (in the distribution of military and economic power), systemic changes 
after decolonization (which multiplied the number of UN members), and normative changes 
(in the value given to diversity, equity, and representation). 187   
Ramesh Thakur identifies the problem clearly when he writes that “as legitimacy erodes, 
capacity to regulate behaviour of member states diminishes.”188  This can be very dangerous, as 
it can affect the capacity and ability of the Security Council to monitor security, and it could 
possibly result in states looking for other means to maintain their version of international order.  
Bypassing the United Nations could become equally as damaging to international peace and 
security as human rights violations.189 
 The Responsibility to Protect is valuable in part because its principles offer defined 
parameters for when the international community should commit to a humanitarian intervention.  
Yet the obstacles and constraints, both to intervention generally and to the implementation of 
R2P, continue to pose a great challenge to change in the international arena.  There is, of course, 
merit to the slow development of norms.  There are a great many minds that need to agree and 
real change takes time to prove worthy of permanence in an internationally governing institution.  
However, while the UN was formulating a consensus on R2P, and even after its adoption of it in 
2005, hundreds of thousands of people in Darfur were being massacred by government troops 
and government-sponsored militia groups.  The Security Council refused to label the crisis as 
genocide, and was very slow to respond with any intervention force.  As the case studies in 
Chapter Three will show, there are a great many factors involved in UN decision making.  As 
discussed earlier, competing geopolitical interests, the complexities of domestic governing 
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structures, and the often insurmountable costs of global military operations are only some of the 
difficulties involved in humanitarian interventions.  The Security Council holds the power to 
respond to disasters in any fashion that it agrees upon, but often withholds that authority.  
Because of this, a constant struggle exists between new norms and old strategies.  
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Chapter 3  Practical Implementation: The Case Studies 
  
 The UN's practice of humanitarian intervention is constantly under scrutiny from the 
international community.  It has been very difficult for the Security Council to find definitive 
answers to the questions of where, when, and how troops should be authorized to protect.  The 
Security Council's decision making can be very inconsistent, demonstrated by the contrasting 
responses to the crises in Darfur and Libya.  Security Council indecision in Darfur will be 
contrasted against the quick action in Libya.  The case studies of Darfur and Libya will illustrate 
the challenges of humanitarian intervention and the permanent realities of the international 
system impeding implementation of the R2P principles.  Every crisis situation is different, 
requiring consideration of cultural, political, economic, and moral factors.  Examining these 
components can help to explain why, where, and when interventions are authorized to take place.  
The case studies will also provide insight into how the Responsibility to Protect can overcome 
constraints to humanitarian intervention.      
 
Darfur 
 
 The case of Darfur exemplifies the risks of a late or hesitant intervention strategy by the 
United Nations.  It is an example of the difficulties associated with intervention and the problems 
that the authors of  R2P sought to mitigate.  The Darfur region is situated adjacent to the nation 
of Chad, on the north western border of Sudan and has an arid desert in the north and a rich 
savannah with abundant rainfall in the south.190  The multiple indigenous groups that occupy the 
region have co-existed for centuries and although there has been plenty of ethnic commingling 
and intermarriage, there are two primary ethnic and linguistic groups involved in the most 
current conflict.  A history of competition between the primarily Arab-speaking nomadic 
pastoralists and the non-Arab speaking African sedentary farming communities has characterized 
Darfur for decades.  The two groups are involved in a complex rivalry over water resources in 
the largely dry and arid region of Sudan and reoccurring drought, desertification, and shrinking 
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resources created widespread famine during the 1980s and 90s.191  Furthermore, many farmers 
and pastoralists were forced to look elsewhere for more arable land, exacerbating long-held 
disputes over land ownership.  A United Nations Environment Programme study concluded that 
although the "immediate" cause of the Darfur conflict was the regional rebellion, its "true 
genesis...pre-dates 2003 and is to be found in failing rains and creeping desertification."192 
 A "chronic problem" of bad governance, including weak institutions and political 
corruption, has existed in Sudan since it declared independence from British colonial rule by a 
parliamentary vote in 1956.193  Sudan's bad governance has been characterized by failed attempts 
at democracy, political instability, corruption and favoritism, low standards of living, civil wars, 
and extensive human rights violations.  The current dictatorship under Omar al-Bashir only 
began when Bashir was appointed President in 1993 following a military coup in 1989.  
Furthermore, the historical competition for resources between the two ethnic groups has been 
continually exacerbated by the government of Sudan and the Arabic Sudanese elites who have 
"systematically marginalized the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups in the country's 
peripheries."194  The government has been primarily dominated by Arab-speaking elites 
throughout the past several decades.  Following the drought and famine in the 1980s,  Arab 
pastoralists and African farmers disagreed over water and land ownership.  Farmers started 
closing off precious access to traditional lands from the herding pastoralists, who began attacking 
farming communities out of desperation.195  Non-Arab farmers began accusing the government 
of allowing the famine to happen and Arab pastoralists believed farmers were restricting access 
to land vindictively.  This led to an Arab supremacist movement.  The Sadiq El Mahdi 
government, which was formed as a coalition and ruled from 1986-89, began arming Arab 
militias to carry out attacks against African communities who opposed the government and 
restricted land access.196  President Omar al-Bashir continued to favour Arab communities and 
sponsor militias when he began his dictatorship in 1989. 
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 In 2003, ethnic clashes broke out over land resources and the government's sponsorship of 
Arab militia attacks.  Early in the year, African militants had organized into the Sudanese 
Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and began carrying out 
attacks on police outposts and government buildings in Darfur, in opposition to President 
Bashir's abuse and discrimination.197  In April, protesting against years of mistreatment, 
government favoritism, and corruption, African militants attacked the airport of  Fasher, in the 
capital of North Darfur. 198  The rebels destroyed several planes and helicopter gunships and 
killed over 100 soldiers before withdrawing from the area. 199  In response to this attack, 
President Bashir began a brutal counterinsurgency campaign against all African rebels and ethnic 
African farmers, which spiralled into civilian massacres and a civil war lasting over ten years.  
The counterinsurgency was led by ethnically Arab government-sponsored Janjaweed militia 
groups, coordinated with government air attacks.  The Sudanese government supplied the 
Janjaweed with arms and ammunition.  The Janjaweed carried out ground attacks on villages and 
rebel strongholds by killing, raping, and kidnapping both civilians and militants.  The massacres 
were condemned by the UN and independent humanitarian groups as crimes against humanity.200  
According to reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the Janjaweed 
militias engaged in an "ethnically-targeted campaign of mass killings, forced displacement, 
destruction of property and the use of rape as a weapon of war."201  The Janjaweed practiced a 
scorched earth policy on countless villages in addition to the rape, pillaging, and murder of up to 
approximately 400, 000 civilians in the Darfur region.  Of the Darfur civilians and rebels who 
have not been killed through violence, disease, or starvation, approximately 2.7 million remain in 
Sudan as internally displaced persons and 250,00 have fled to Chad and the Central African 
Republic as refugees.  The ethnic cleansing and violent struggles for power in this region have 
dragged on for over ten years. 
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 The United Nations' response to the Darfur conflict was infamously muted and uninspired, 
despite its knowledge of the violence as early as 2004.  Although numerous UN resolutions were 
passed throughout the decade, the overall UN strategy was overly cautious, having little success 
at ending the violence.  The UN's response has been described as delayed, "woefully 
inadequate," and ill-conceived.202  Sharath Srinivasan voiced concerns that the international 
community dithered over Darfur and that members of the Security Council participated in a 
"'conspiracy not to see,'"203 in which they purposefully ignored the violence in Darfur to avoid 
having to find a solution.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the cost of major military interventions 
is substantial and can heavily affect UN decision making.  However, there often also needs to be 
some level of national or strategic interests at play to mobilize political will for interventions.  
The Security Council released its first press statement in April 2004, expressing deep concern 
and calling on all parties involved to address the humanitarian crisis and stop all violence. 204  
The Security Council then met in July and September of 2004 to discuss the crisis and during 
these meetings it was accepted by essentially every state that the unfolding crisis in Darfur was 
"a legitimate matter of international concern."205  In recognition of the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine, many states acknowledged that it was the responsibility of the Sudanese government to 
protect its people.206  However, there was disagreement over whether this meant the international 
community should intervene because the government was failing to uphold its responsibility to 
protect, or the Sudanese needed to resolve the violence internally, free from UN involvement.  
The Philippines and the United Kingdom both declared in a Security Council meeting that the 
international community must intervene, while Pakistan and China maintained that intervention 
in this instance would impinge on Sudan's sovereignty. 207 
 Several resolutions were passed by the Security Council in 2004,208 calling for a ceasefire, 
disarming of the militias, and missions of inquiry, but little progress in quelling violence was 
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made.  The UN resolutions were ignored by both the government and rebel forces, and attacks 
from both sides continued.  A ceasefire between government authorities and rebel groups was 
brokered by neighbouring country Chad in September of 2003 but it broke down very quickly.  
A long and disappointing pattern of ineffectual strategies and unenforceable declarations 
followed this initial attempt at peace.  Calls for ceasefires were continually ignored and the UN 
was unable to enforce compliance without a significant armed force.  The Council's first 
resolution on Darfur was 1556, adopted July 30, 2004.  The UNSC did not authorize a military 
intervention, but instead resolved to send international monitors to Darfur and declared an arms 
embargo on all non-governmental entities.  Resolution 1556 mandated that all states prevent non-
government entities operating in Darfur from acquiring military equipment through all sources, 
including the Sudanese government.  The resolution further condemned the violence and 
demanded the Sudanese government take all appropriate measures to stop it.  African Union 
forces were authorized to protect the international monitors, but according to Luke Glanville, 
they were "slowly deployed, weakly mandated, and largely ineffective."209 
 Another resolution, 1564, was passed in September 2004 and increased the size of the AU-
led mission to monitor the demanded ceasefire.  Resolution1564 expressed grave concerns about 
the lack of progress in disarming the Janjaweed and encouraged all member states to support the 
African Union in its increased monitoring campaign, but the Council still declared that it would 
only consider, and not yet commit, to taking additional measures. 210  Despite the UN Security 
Council consensus that a monitoring mission and declarations of ceasefire were the appropriate 
courses of action, the Council lacked the will and capability of implementing the 2004 
resolutions.  According to Prendergast and Sullivan, the resolutions  "lacked a robust 
enforcement mechanism and [were] disregarded on the ground as the situation deteriorated."211  
They argue that subsequent resolutions on Darfur "followed this depressing pattern of 
inefficacy,"212 proving unable to command the adherence of the warring parties.  Security 
Council Resolution 1574, passed in November of 2004, increased the African mission to 3,320 
personnel and reiterated the importance of a ceasefire in Darfur.   However, peace in Darfur was 
emphasized as an important part of the greater goal of finding a peace agreement to end the 
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north-south civil war in Sudan.  Ending the civil war in Sudan occupied a great deal of the UN 
Security Council's attention during the crisis in Darfur.  The proximity in geography and time to 
other large-scale UN operations is a third factor of decision making to be discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
 Resolutions in early 2005 did little more than extend the mandated time spans of current 
missions established to monitor the national civil war.  Throughout the next few years, the 
United Nations Security Council continued to devise unsuccessful strategies for quelling the 
violence in Darfur.  The Council's hesitancy over an armed intervention continued and  it was 
unable to get either side to adhere to a ceasefire.  Resolution 1590 reiterated concerns of 
continued violations of ceasefires and the failure of the government to disarm the Janjaweed, 
"strongly condemning all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the 
Darfur region."213  Resolution 1590 stated that there "can be no military solution to the conflict 
in Darfur,"214 calling upon both the rebels and the government to work to negotiate a peace 
agreement.  It also created the 10,000 strong United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to work 
closely with the current African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in monitoring adherence to 
ceasefire protocols.  UNMIS was further tasked with protecting UN personnel and civilians in 
immediate danger, but continued to be ineffective.  Arab militias continued burning villages, 
killing civilians, attacking refugee camps, and targeting international aid workers.  In September 
2005, the United Nations chief aid coordinator stated that violence in Darfur was so serious that 
UN relief efforts might be forced to end at any time. 215 
 Resolution 1591 established a committee of Security Council members to oversee 
adherence to ceasefires and previous UN resolutions.   Resolution 1593, passed in March 2005, 
referred the Darfur conflict to the International Criminal Court.  The referral to the ICC came in 
the wake of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry, which documented the many 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law occurring in Darfur. 216  The 
Security Council concluded, based on the report, that the conflict in Sudan continued to 
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constitute a "threat to international peace and security,"217 and its resolution required 
international legal action.  Resolutions 1590, 1591, and 1593 arguably authorized more 
significant action to end the violence in Darfur than their predecessors, but were just as 
ineffective and received less support from the Security Council.  Neither 1591 nor 1593 passed 
unanimously, an early indicator that the implementation of both would be weak and 
incomplete.218  Resolution 1591 had three abstentions (Algeria, China, and Russia) and Algeria, 
Brazil, China, and the United States abstained from voting for Resolution 1593.   The message to 
Khartoum eventually became that "the Council's follow-through would be, at best, 
inconsistent,"219 and that there would be no punishment of humanitarian crimes.  
 A peace agreement was brokered by the African Union between one faction of the SLA 
and the government in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2006, but this quickly fell through.220  A 
temporary regional government in Darfur was to be set up and both the rebel factions and 
government militias were to be disarmed and disbanded.  The efforts of the President of Nigeria 
in leading the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks and mediating the Darfur Peace Agreement were 
commended in Security Council Resolution 1679 and later in Resolution 1706 in August 2006.  
However, the peace envisioned in the 2006 agreement was never realized because neither party 
trusted the process to create real peace.  UNMIS was also strengthened in Resolution 1706  by up 
to 17, 300 military personnel to oversee the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.  In 
similar fashion to the previous several years, President al-Bashir continued with his blatant non-
compliance with UN resolutions.  Al-Bashir had previously agreed to allow UN peacekeeping 
troops to enter Sudan to monitor ceasefires.  He later abandoned this pledge and declared that 
'there will not be any international military intervention in Darfur as long as I am in power.'"221  
Without approval from the Sudanese government for a UN presence, the polit ical will of the 
United Nations to enforce its resolutions was considerably lessened. 
 The consent of the governments of countries that may require a humanitarian intervention 
is another factor in UN decision making to be discussed in Chapter Four.  In October 2006, the 
Council once again admitted that its resolutions for peace were being ignored and it expressed in 
Resolution 1714 "grave concern over the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation in 
                                                 
217
 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1593 (2005)."   
218
 Prendergast and Sullivan, "Irresolution: The U.N. Security Council on Darfur."   
219
 Ibid.   
220
 Copnall, "Darfur conflict: Sudan's bloody stalemate." 
221
 Glanville, "Darfur and the responsibilit ies of sovereignty," 471.   
  
52 
 
Darfur."222  A later Resolution in July 2007, Resolution 1769, mandated that a UN/AU hybrid 
force (UNAMID) of approximately 20,000 military personnel, would take over UN operations in 
the region, including monitoring the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.  Resolution 
1769 also mandated that the UNAMID forces would include UN Heavy and Light S upport 
Packages but full deployment of UNAMID was not expected until years later. 223  President al-
Bashir did not consent to the full deployment of UNAMID until July 2008 and it was not until 
that year that the UN added a full force of armed troops, including air support under Resolution 
1828, to join the ineffective AU forces already present.  Unfortunately, the hybrid forces once 
again struggled to quell the ongoing violence, and humanitarian atrocities continued to occur 
over the next several years.  
 The UN committee observing the peace process in Darfur released its first report in 
January of 2006 detailing human rights abuses in Darfur but it was not until after the deployment 
of UNAMID forces in 2008 that the Security Council began to place blame on Pres ident al-
Bashir for fuelling the violence in Darfur.  The committee report detailed "massive violations of 
the arms embargo...multiple instances of breaches to the ban on offensive military flights, 
and...identified a list of 17 individuals impeding the peace process,"224 but the Security Council 
continuously failed to hold the Government of Sudan accountable for humanitarian atrocities.   
Although the situation in Darfur was not initially described as genocide, President Omar al-
Bashir was indicted by the ICC in 2009 for "genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
allegedly committed."225  President al-Bashir has been largely ignored by the international 
community and has faced no prosecution despite his indictment in 2009 and further warrants for 
arrest in 2010.226  The language and terminology associated with a crisis often dictates in what 
capacity the international community will respond, and the actions of the Sudanese government 
were not viewed as genocide until years after the conflict in Darfur began.  Language is another 
factor in UN decision making to be discussed in Chapter Four.   In May 2011, the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur was signed in Qatar by the government and several rebel factions.  
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The Doha Document is the most recent attempt at peace and reconciliation in the region, but 
violent clashes continue. 
 As of 2015, ten years after the UN historically referred Darfur to the ICC, the conflict has 
continued.  There are still five unresolved cases at the ICC that are related to Darfur, and four 
main suspects at large subject to outstanding arrest warrants.227  Most of the suspects also are 
still in high positions within the Government of Sudan, where they continue to carry out 
humanitarian atrocities.228   The government campaign under President al-Bashir against the 
African Darfurians has continued with vengeance.  The Janjaweed has been "reincarnated as the 
Rapid Support Force (RSF)," with a renewed commitment to scorched earth campaigns and 
"ground attacks coordinated with aerial bombardment by the Sudanese air force."229  In the wake 
of numerous violations of human rights and countless reports of crimes against humanity, the 
outgoing prosecutor at the International Criminal Court has expressed extreme concern for the 
lack of progress and inability to adapt new strategies.  The prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
urges much tougher action with respect to crimes in Darfur, including possibly seizing 
individuals with open warrants inside the borders of Sudan.  The chief prosecutor said in 2012, 
"When you review the situation of the last seven years, it's time to do something new in Darfur.  
Nothing has worked."230   
 
Libya 
 
 In contrast to the international response to the war in Darfur, the UN's action in Libya was 
swift and definitive.  The factors which prevented a major military intervention in Darfur did not 
present the same obstacles during the Libyan crisis.  The author will argue in Chapter Four that 
the initial intervention is a legitimate use of the principles of R2P, but there are unforeseen 
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ramifications that have come from the UN-authorized mission.  The Libyan case study will 
demonstrate further the complexity of the humanitarian intervention issue. 
 Before violence erupted in Libya in 2011, the 'Arab Spring' had been sweeping through the 
Middle East and North Africa, spurring rebellious populations to stand up against dictatorships.  
Pro-democratic movements emerged in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Morocco, and 
Jordan.  Although the movement had domestic origins in "unfulfilled socio-economic 
demands,"231 for many, the Arab Spring is an indicator of the development of more liberal 
international norms, including the role of the Responsibility to Protect, in previously 
undemocratic non- liberal areas.  Christian Henderson argues in the Liverpool Law Review that 
aspects of state sovereignty have been challenged throughout the Arab Spring, in large part due 
to the human rights atrocities occurring within sovereign states. 232  According to Sheri Berman, 
"the year 2011 was the dawn of a promising new era for the region."233  She argues that it will be 
remembered as a "historical watershed" for democracy in the Middle East. 234   Libya's Arab 
Spring began with the illegitimate arrest of a Libyan human rights lawyer by the regime of 
Colonel Muammar Gadhafi.  The lawyer, Fathi Tarbel, was the representative of relatives of over 
1,000 prisoners killed in the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre - a "bloody landmark in Muammar 
Gadhafi's 42-year rule."235  The political prisoners and opponents of the government held at Abu 
Salim were gunned down in a riot protesting the poor living conditions of the prison.  Tarbel was 
arrested on suspicion of trying to organize protests against the Gadhafi regime.  Young people 
inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt began peaceful demonstrations February 5, 2011, 
in the city of Benghazi.  After the four-decade long brutal Gadhafi dictatorship, protesters began 
calling for Gadhafi to step down and for the regime to release Tarbel and other political 
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prisoners.236  What began as a protest of hundreds grew into a full-scale international 
humanitarian crisis. 
 Antigovernment protests were met with regime brutality.  Government authorities used 
water cannons and teargas to break up a group of over 6,000 protestors.  It was not long before 
the government crackdowns turned lethal, and the violent conflict between government forces 
and  protesters resulted in deaths of unarmed protestors.  On February 18, 2011, the 
government's use of heavy weapons, the recruitment of mercenaries, and massacres of up to sixty 
people had been reported, despite an official news blackout. 237  The revolts intensified and 
enraged protestors began arming themselves.  The militarized rebels were joined by political and 
civil society leaders who organized into the National Transitional Council (NTC) to represent 
and promote the rebel cause.  The rebels began fighting government forces for control of the 
country's major cities and they started seizing control of abandoned government arms depots.  
The city of Benghazi quickly fell under control of the armed rebels, and became a focal point for 
the crisis as violence spread throughout Libya.  
 Over the past four decades, Gadhafi's dictatorship had been characterized by a rampant 
disregard for human rights including restrictions on civil rights and liberties and torture of 
opponents to the regime.238  Early on, Gadhafi made clear his intentions to crush the rebellions 
and threatened that there would be much bloodshed to regain control of the country.  Gadhafi's 
son, Sayf  al-Islam, gave a defiant address on state television on February 21, 2011,  stating that 
"further demonstrations could lead to civil war" and that "the regime would fight 'to the last 
bullet.'"239  Thousands were killed in clashes with government forces during the early months of 
the civil conflict, which included attacks by tanks, artillery, warplanes, and helicopter 
gunships.240  The regime's violent retaliation also included firing live rounds into crowds of 
civilians, arresting and kidnapping hundreds of suspected protestors, launching mortar-fired 
cluster munitions into residential areas, and laying thousands of landmines. 241  Human Rights 
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Watch also documented cases of gang rape and other sexual violence, as well as summary 
executions. 
 The United Nations responded very quickly to the violence, condemning Gadhafi's 
crackdowns on innocent protestors and rebel groups alike only days after the conflict began.  On 
February 22, the Security Council acknowledged that the Government of Libya had a 
responsibility to protect its population, calling for it to respect humanitarian law. 242  The United 
Nations Human Rights council condemned the "gross and systematic" violations of human rights 
in Libya, and called for an official inquiry on February 25. 243  On February 26, the UN Security 
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1970 with all members present.  Resolution 1970 
imposed a very detailed arms embargo and sanctions on Gadhafi and his family.  The Security 
Council demanded Gadhafi halt his attacks on civilians, banned international travel by members 
of the regime, and froze all their financial assets.244  Resolution 1970 also referred the Libyan 
crisis to the ICC to investigate the humanitarian crimes occurring throughout several major 
cities.  Despite Resolution 1970, violence continued to escalate and heavy artillery attacks 
resulted in many more deaths.  On March 6, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the 
escalation in violence, warning of coming "carnage" and calling for "an immediate halt to the 
government's disproportionate use of force and indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets."245  The 
international community became increasingly concerned as Gadhafi's forces began to make 
significant gains in the conflict against rebel-held cities.  On March 15, Gadhafi loyalists 
launched a major attack and took control of the city of Ajdābiyā, a previously held stronghold of 
protestors en route to Benghazi, Gadhafi's next major target. 246  The possibility of an impending 
government-sponsored massacre in Benghazi spurred the international community into 
immediate action. 
 On March 17, 2011, a month after the conflict began, in response to civilian deaths and the 
possible danger of greater violence, the United Nations Security Council voted with zero against 
and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, and the Russian Federation) on a military 
intervention operation to protect civilians.  The five abstaining members supported ending the 
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violence in Libya, but believed that the proposed use of force was a dangerous and excessive 
overstep.  The delegate from Brazil stated that, "the text of resolution 1973(2011) contemplates 
measures that go far beyond the call" and "such measures may have the unintended effect 
of...causing more harm than good."247  Despite these reservations, Resolution 1973 was passed 
with no votes against.  The council deplored "the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with 
resolution 1970" and expressed "grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of 
violence, and the heavy civilian casualties."248  The resolution also referred to the R2P doctrine 
in the preamble, which states that the Libyan authorities had the responsibility to protect Libya's 
population.249  Resolution 1973 authorized a NATO-imposed no-fly zone to prevent further 
government air attacks and permitted "all necessary measures to protect civilians."250  The no-fly 
zone involved a ban on all Libyan military flights, enforced by periodic NATO flights, and the 
destruction of Libyan military and air force capabilities.  Although the initial resolution excluded 
foreign occupation of any Libyan territories, the United Nations was deliberate in its decision to 
take all other necessary actions to "protect civilians and civilian areas targeted by Colonel 
Muammar [Gadhafi], his allied forces and mercenaries."251  In the wake of Resolution 1973, the 
Libyan Government declared an immediate ceasefire to prevent the implementation of the no-fly 
zone, but it was largely symbolic and promptly ignored by government and rebel forces.  
 On March 18, following Resolution 1973, air and naval forces from UN members in North 
America, Europe and the Middle East began preparations to implement the no-fly zone.252  On 
the 19th of March, the coalition began attacking targets in Libya, attempting to disable Libya's 
air force and air defenses so the UN could impose its no-fly zone effectively.253  Initially, the air 
raids and missile attacks were very effective, crippling the Libyan air force.  Sixteen countries 
took part in enforcing the no-fly zone, destroying  5,900 targets which included 600 armoured 
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vehicles and 400 artillery launchers.254  Despite, the success of the no-fly zone, fighting between 
armed rebel groups and government forces continued on the ground.  Gadhafi was slowly losing 
his supporters, but the opposition groups were too unorganized to overthrow the dictator.   
 NATO officially took over the UN-authorized mission as of March 31, and a UN debate 
over military intervention on the ground began.  The original UN mandate for the Libyan 
mission was 90 days, ending in June of 2011.  The NATO mission was eventually extended 
another 90 days to continue protecting civilians in danger and to support the opposition forces to 
Gadhafi.255  The mission extension also aimed to send a message to the Libyan rebels trying to 
overthrow Col Muammar Gadhafi after more than four decades of brutal autocratic rule. 256  
According to NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the message to the Libyan 
rebels was to say, "We stand united to make sure that you can shape your own future.  And that 
day is getting closer."257  The regime was eventually overthrown after rebel forces captured the 
city of Tripoli and Gadhafi was captured and killed in October of the same year.  Although not 
initially an intervention with occupying forces on the ground, the NATO air support and UN 
pledge to end violence against civilians resulted in the ending of an oppressive dictatorship.  
 The Responsibility to Protect was already an adopted principle when the crisis in Libya 
began and was cited in resolution 1973 as a motivating factor for UN action.  Initially, the 
intervention in Libya was hailed as an affirmation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.  
According to Alex Bellamy, the R2P doctrine was influential in the decision to intervene in 
Libya.  This fact indicates that attitudes in the Security Council had changed towards the use of 
force for human protection purposes and that the doctrine has become a "commonly accepted 
frame of reference for preventing and responding to mass atrocities."258   There have, however, 
been major developments following the NATO operation that further complicate the 
implementation of R2P and epitomize the unknown consequences of military operations, 
particularly during violent civil conflicts. 
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 Although initially supportive of the NATO intervention in Libya, the League of Arab states 
has since taken a critical stance in light of the extended bombing campaigns.  It is estimated that 
up to 30,000 Libyans were killed during the UN authorized air strikes. 259  Great Britain and 
France were instrumental in garnering support for the intervention and, aside from the United 
States, carried out the majority of the coalition air strikes.  The British and French involvement 
in Libya has led to several accusations of NATO misappropriation of force and contravention of 
the R2P principles.  Weeks after the NATO strikes began, many nations were publicly skeptical 
about NATO's "bending of the UN resolution."260  Past Arab League secretary-general Amr 
Moussa said that he "'deplored' the bombing campaign: 'What happened in Libya is different 
from the intended aim of imposing the no-fly zone.  We want to protect civilians, not the 
bombing of more civilians."261  NATO was also accused of pursuing an intervention in Libya 
specifically for the purposes of regime change.  South Africa, along with other African nations, 
maintained that the solution to Libya needed to be diplomatic and "continued to criticize the 
interventions."262  Six months after the intervention, France had been caught airlifting weapons 
to rebel groups, which was a violation of the terms of the UN resolution. 263 
 A report from Human Rights Watch acknowledges that NATO took every precaution 
possible to minimize civilian casualties during the air strikes and that casualties were unusually 
low, but details the existence of eight different individual cases during which civilians were 
wrongfully targeted.  Faiz Fathi Jfara, a local Libyan, lost five members of his family in a NATO 
bombing mission and asked, "I just need an answer from NATO: Why did you destroy my home 
and kill my family?"264  Human Rights Watch documents that up to 72 civilians were wrongfully 
targeted and killed in the strikes, and none of the deaths have been acknowledged or explained 
by NATO.265  The worst case of indiscriminate NATO bombing documented by Human Rights 
Watch happened in the village of Majer, where NATO strikes killed 34 people in a reportedly 
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civilian compound.266  Fred Abrahams, a special adviser at Human Rights Watch, states, 
"Attacks are allowed only on military targets, and serious questions remain in some incidents 
about what exactly NATO forces were striking."267 
 Lasting peace and the creation of a legitimate and functioning government post-Gadhafi is 
proving to be incredibly complicated in Libya.  In the years after the intervention, armed clashes 
and competition for control in the power void following Gadhafi's dictatorship have continued, 
displacing hundreds of thousands.268 Many argue that the power vacuum has created more 
violence than would have occurred if the NATO operation had never taken place.  David 
Kirkpatrick argues that, "The collapse of the Qaddafi government and the looting of its 
armories...left Libyans at the mercy of fractious local militias that emerged in the aftermath ."269  
According to Mohammed Nuruzzaman, in the period following the intervention, tens of 
thousands of armed militants have taken over different regions of the country.  Nuruzzaman 
states that "Libya descended into a state of complete chaos where unruly and aggressive militant 
groups clashed with each other and held the common Libyans hostage."270  The Islamic State, an  
extremist group known for terror tactics, kidnapping, and mass killings, has gained a foothold in 
Libya and claimed responsibility for many deadly attacks on civilians. 271  Libya's current 
infrastructure and civil society has been half destroyed by air strikes and infighting since 
February 2011.  In direct contradiction of the intended purposes of the R2P doctrine, the current 
struggle for power between rival ethnic, religious, and political militia groups has the potential to 
prolong a civil war in Libya for many years.272   
 The continuing post- intervention violence in Libya has also spilled into other regions of 
North Africa.  Militant rebel groups and extremist factions who have gained power in Libya 
began smuggling weapons left from the earlier fighting across the Algerian desert, fuelling a 
growing insurgency in Mali.  The Tuareg rebels, armed by Libyan militants, started a violent 
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campaign against any opposition, including the government of Mali.  The situation grew into full 
scale civil war, with the Mali government declaring war on the Tuaregs in May of 2014. 273  
There have been many consequences following the intervention in Libya, and the uncontrollable 
spread of weapons across borders is only one.  The Arab League's condemnation of the NATO 
bombing and the ambivalence of many Libyans towards the humanitarian intent of the UN has 
most certainly called into question the Responsibility to Protect doctrine its alleged success 
under Resolution 1973.  The R2P doctrine was created in 2001 with the intention of guiding 
decision making and preventing future humanitarian disasters, but as will be examined further in 
Chapter Four, the controversial intervention in Libya and its many consequences have cast 
considerable doubt on the effectiveness of R2P and illustrates further dangers of military 
intervention. 
 In contrast to the UN Security Council's caution and restraint during the war in Darfur, the 
international response to the Libyan crisis was remarkably quick and definitive.  It took the 
Security Council almost a year to officially acknowledge the humanitarian crimes occurring in 
Sudan's western region.  A month after unrest began in Libya, the Security Council had 
authorized an airborne military intervention.  There are clear differences between the two cases 
that help to explain the contrasting strategies chosen by the members of the Security Council, but 
the existence of humanitarian atrocities is the same in both cases.  It has been an ongoing 
struggle for the international community to rationalize why some humanitarian crises warrant 
immediate UN military intervention and others do not.  There are many factors which influence 
UN decision making, and Chapter Four will discuss select circumstances of each case study 
which help to explain the differing UN responses.  The Responsibility to Protect was officially 
adopted by the United Nations in 2005, two years after the war in Darfur had began.  There is 
evidence that the R2P doctrine played a part in the UN's decision to intervene quickly in Libya.  
There are many obstacles to humanitarian interventions but the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
provides a guideline to start addressing some of these difficulties.     
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Chapter 4 UN Decision-Making: Lessons for the Future Implementation of the 
R2P Doctrine     
 
 Despite difficulties and constraints with which the doctrine has been applied, the 
Responsibility to Protect still has great potential to be a guiding doctrine during humanitarian 
disasters.  There are clear obstacles to humanitarian intervention, as illustrated in Chapter Two 
and Chapter Three, and many of them are permanent fixtures of international relations.  As the 
case studies have illustrated, the UN Security Council struggles with the questions of when and 
how to intervene.  The practical implementation of the Responsibility to Protect and 
humanitarian intervention is full of complications.  During the crises in Darfur and Libya, there 
were many factors that influenced decision-making in the Security Council, resulting in 
drastically different approaches.   The list of these factors is not exhaustive but many of them 
heavily influenced decision-making in the cases of Darfur and Libya.  The factors include 
situational language, strategic interests, host state consent, proximity to other military operations, 
and the anticipated cost of intervention.  It is valuable for the future of humanitarian intervention 
to discuss these influences, as such a discussion can shed light on past challenges and identify 
the areas where R2P requires attention. 
 Humanitarian intervention is a legal and legitimate UN tactic that has been developing over 
a long period of time in response to the combination of local and global crises.  Humanitarian 
intervention began with the transition from traditional peacekeeping to more militarized 
interventions and intensified after the end of the Cold War.  The Responsibility to Protect is the 
modern manifestation of that development and provides a guideline for addressing many of the 
obstacles to decision making at the UN.   After the UNSC disagreement over the intervention in 
Libya and in the context of the ongoing situation in Syria, there are further questions about 
whether or not the Responsibility to Protect has failed and will fade out of usage.  As the case 
studies of Darfur and Libya have shown, there are clearly more obstacles to be overcome, but 
recent crises have not undone decades of development of humanitarian intervention.  R2P is a 
valuable doctrine within the context of the humanitarian intervention movement and should not 
be abandoned so quickly because of continuing global humanitarian concerns.  
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Darfur Examined 
 
  To begin with, terminology can determine how a situation is perceived and can have a big 
impact on how the international community decides to act.  Whether or not a humanitarian 
disaster qualifies for a UN authorized intervention under the Charter, and under the modified 
version of the Responsibility to Protect, depends on how it is defined.  Under Chapter 7 of the 
United Nations Charter, the qualifications for UN action are somewhat vague.  Anything that is a 
“threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”274 could potentially qualify for a 
military response.  However, the Security Council ultimately has the power to decide which 
crisis qualifies as a humanitarian disaster.  Herein lies the paradox of definition and language.  
As general as the Charter is about threats to international security, it is very difficult to make a 
case that any humanitarian disaster is large or critical enough to warrant the attention of the 
Security Council. 
 Narrowing the parameters under the Responsibility to Protect has not necessarily made it 
easier for the Security Council to make decisions about humanitarian intervention.  The 
principles of the Responsibility to Protect focus on expediting and simplifying decision making 
in situations of  humanitarian emergency.  The doctrine was, in part, created to change the 
language and discussion of humanitarian intervention from being about the rights of nations to 
intervene in the affairs of other countries to focusing on the rights of people to be protected and 
the responsibility of nations to provide that protection.275  The final R2P document emphasizes 
that genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing are all disasters 
requiring the attention of the international community, demonstrating that a government has 
failed to protect its citizens.  These specific terms both help to define which crises require UN 
intervention and complicate the decision making process.  Despite the creation of the R2P 
principles, it is a constant struggle to decide how narrow the qualifications are for each term.  
What might commonly be perceived as genocide can be debated in terms of the exact number of 
deaths required or whether or not ethnicity is the true motivation. 
 During the crisis in Darfur, it was the language that many were not willing to use that 
partially prevented the conflict from being viewed with more urgency.  US Secretary of State at 
                                                 
274
 Charter of the United Nations, “Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression.”  
275
 Cottey, “Beyond Humanitarian Intervention,” 435.    
  
64 
 
the time, Colin Powell, described the situation in Darfur as genocide in September of 2004, but 
the UNSC was unwilling to use that term.276  Some argue that abstaining from using the term 
genocide purposefully avoided the requirement to provide tangible civilian protection while still 
ensuring that there was diplomatic pressure applied in a safe way. 277  This hesitation by so many 
nations to label Darfur as a genocide contributed to the stagnant response, and has the potential 
to influence the international community in other cases.  The Foreign Policy Centre argues, "All 
too many case studies confirm that misdiagnosis of the conflict is a major cause of the failure of 
even the best-intentioned prevention efforts."278  According to Jess Gifkins, the language of the 
Responsibility to Protect was also an obstacle to UN action during the Darfur crisis.  In 2006, the 
Security Council took six months to negotiate Resolution 1706 and "language on R2P proved to 
be one of the most difficult aspects."279  In 2007, the Council was once again unable to agree on 
a reference to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and it was removed from an early draft of a 
Darfur resolution.  Gifkins explains that specific language is so integral to Security Council 
resolutions because it reflects current shared understandings, informs future resolutions, and 
reaffirms past agreements through repetition.280  The architects of the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine intended to establish clearer definitional language to aid decision makers, but 
manipulation of that language based on national interests also affects the ability of the UN to 
prevent humanitarian disasters.  
 National interest is one of the biggest driving forces in the international community.  
Amstutz writes that humanitarian intervention is justified if it can pass both political and ethical 
tests.  First and foremost,  
Humanitarian intervention must be in the interests of the intervening state or states.  This 
condition is satisfied when the intervening state perceives human rights abuses in a foreign 
country as either a general threat to the order, legitimacy, and morality of global society or, 
as is most often the case, a particular threat to its own economic prosperity, political 
influence, and territorial integrity.281 
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Strategic interests and geopolitics often motivate powerful states to manipulate language and 
other details to influence UN opinions.  When presented with an opportunity for humanitarian 
intervention, a state will often ask itself if “committing...young service members, at risk of life 
and limb, for purely ‘humanitarian reasons’ is legitimate national policy.” 282  States carry heavy 
biases and hold certain principles or ventures above others.  Renowned classical realist Hans J. 
Morgenthau has said that national interests,  at least for the USA, are derived from specific 
interests which “protect its physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by 
other nations” and that foreign policy based on impractical, or ‘moral’, principles “relegates the 
national interest to the background...[and is] a policy of national suicide, actual or potential.”283  
At least from a realist standpoint, it is natural, expected, and legitimate for states to respond to 
international relations in a way that solves external problems while still benefitting the nation. 
 In the case of Darfur, a substantial lack of urgency in the Security Council resulted in an 
uninspired campaign for conflict resolution and a muted interest in human rights violations.  
Certain members of the Security Council have been accused of purposefully stalling intervention 
in Sudan because of the economic and political implications.  China has strong economic ties 
with Sudan and buys a majority of the nation's oil.284  As Hilary Andersson wrote, "[China] 
believes that what Sudan needs is good business partners, help with development and a solid 
peace process in Darfur, instead of confrontation and sanctions from the West."285  In fact, China 
has been accused in the past of assisting the Government of Sudan militarily, going against the 
arms embargo set in place by the UN, and prolonging the conflict. 286  Furthermore, when the 
United Nations authorizes interventions in response to intra-state humanitarian crises, the 
practice of interfering in the domestic affairs of sovereign states becomes more legitimate.  Both 
China and Russia, among other member states, have been accused by Human Right Watch of 
systematically violating the human rights of their citizens.287  As the sanctity of state sovereignty 
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erodes, and the importance of addressing domestic human rights violations increases, the 
possibility of the international community turning its attention to Chinese and Russian violations 
increases as well.  According to Stewart M. Patrick, China and Russia are worried that support 
for interventions "could create a precedent for the international community to have a say in how 
they treat their own, sometimes restive, minority populations."288  In contrast to the UN's 
response to Darfur, the same year that the crisis began, the United States intervened in Iraq 
despite strong international opposition.  Although the Saddam Hussein regime “was responsible 
for the murder of at least 400,000 of its own people in the 15 years from 1988 to 2003,”289 the 
international community did not support any claims of a humanitarian crisis.  The USA has often 
been accused of harbouring strategic interests in foreign oil and illegitimately manipulating facts 
to intervene and topple Hussein, who was unfriendly to the United States.290  National interests 
influence every facet of international relations and often inhibit the UN Security Council from 
focusing solely on the humanitarian needs of populations in other states. 
 Compatibility with internal governing structures also posed a problem for R2P, as 
demonstrated through the case studies.  Despite the fact that the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine dropped the requirement for host state consent in situations of humanitarian atrocity, 
this issue remains a large obstacle.  As previously stated, the adopted R2P doctrine asserts that if 
a government is manifestly failing to protect its citizens, then the international community is 
obligated to intervene.  This transfer of responsibility signifies that citizen safety becomes the 
top priority regardless of the existence of the host state's consent.  With the legitimacy of R2P, 
and the authority coming from Chapter 7 of the Charter, the UN cannot legally be stopped from 
intervening in a domestic case of humanitarian disaster.  However offending state regimes or 
regional leaders that permit humanitarian atrocities to occur often resist external involvement.  
During the war in Darfur, host state consent was a huge limiting factor for possible UN 
involvement.  The Janjaweed militias were government sponsored, and President al-Bashir was 
the primary aggressor against civilians and rebel groups alike.  The difficulty of disarming the 
                                                 
288
 Jayshree Bajoria and Robert McMahon, "The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention," Council on Foreign 
Relations, June 12, 2013, accessed June 6, 2016,  http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemma-
humanitarian-intervention/p16524.  
289
 David Fisher and Nigel Biggar, “Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections on Libya,” 
International Affairs 87(3) (2011): 696.   
290
 Antonia Juhasz, “Why the war in Iraq was fought for Big Oil,” CNN, April 15, 2013, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/.  
  
67 
 
Janjaweed clearly stemmed from the lack of government cooperation, 291 and the United Nations 
was largely unwilling in this case to go against such a violent dictator.  As discussed in Chapter 
Three, President al-Bashir initially consented to allow UN staff and peacekeeping troops to enter 
Sudan.  Bashir quickly abandoned this promise, publicly rejecting any foreign occupation in 
Sudan and effectively stifling the political will of the UN to enforce their resolutions.  Despite 
several resolutions authorizing over 20,000 UN troops to monitor ceasefires in Sudan, the United 
Nations failed to intervene on the ground in Darfur until after President al-Bashir consented.            
 Sending UN troops into a hostile area unsupported by the national regime is dangerous.  
This fact can be a motivating factor to not intervene when it lines up with geopolitical interests 
of UNSC states.  China is one of many states that continually stands by the belief that host state 
consent is a prerequisite for deployments to protect citizens.292  However, the Chinese did not 
veto the resolution to intervene in Libya, showing that they reserve the right to pick and choose 
those situations in which they stand by that principle.   Alternatively, when the legitimacy of a 
government fails, support from regional organizations or neighbouring authorities can sometimes 
have an impact on decision-making, as happened in the case of Libya.  Despite this support, the 
African Union was unable to procure UN assistance in Darfur for many years.  Ultimately, 
whether it is used as an excuse to mask deeper geopolitical interests, or whether it was out of 
genuine concern, domestic consent often determines the difficulty and costs of an intervention, 
and as such is an important situational factor to monitor. 
 In addition, the geographical and temporal proximity to other large scale military 
operations can influence decision making in multiple ways.  The post 9/11 war on terrorism was 
a major distraction for several states during the crisis in Darfur.  Alex Bellamy argues that 
although the international community has been increasingly focused on stopping humanitarian 
crises, many Western states had other interests following 2001.  During the war on terror, 
Western powers were preoccupied with "new strategic priorities of terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 'rogue states.'"293  Bellamy argues that in this context, 
states were less willing to intervene for humanitarian purposes and the threat of terrorism 
overshadowed the humanitarian crimes in Darfur.  The long military campaigns in the Middle 
East during the war on terror, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, have commanded not only the 
                                                 
291
 Piiparinen, "Reconsidering the silence over the ultimate crime," 74.   
292
 Bellamy, "The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," 828.  
293
 Cottey, "Beyond Humanitarian Intervention," 430.   
  
68 
 
attention, but the resources of many countries as well.  There is only a limited amount of energy 
and forces that any one country can commit.  Engaging in new conflicts when overstretched is 
undesirable and sometimes not possible.  The morale of a nation and its leaders can fall very low, 
particularly following bloody or drawn out campaigns.  This often weakens the willingness to 
risk additional lives in new ones.  Described by Andrew Cottey as the "Iraq syndrome,"294  the 
scale of military engagement shaped the lack of intervention in Darfur and proximate 
humanitarian conflicts.  During the war in Darfur, there was a very clear reluctance to intervene 
forcefully for humanitarian purposes,295 not only because of resource and morale exhaustion, but 
also because Middle Eastern and Western relationships had also been severely strained by the 
war in Iraq.  According to Bellamy, the government of Sudan had become a reliable source of 
intelligence for the war on terror,296 making Western allies in the Security Council reluctant to 
take a hard stance against al-Bashir for fear of losing valuable information. 
 The war in Darfur began the same year that the United States invaded Iraq.  Much of the 
international community's attention was focused on the Hussein regime.  Momentum was never 
strong for doing something in the Sudan.  The "War on Terror" certainly drained not only the 
military, but the political capacities of states who previously had advocated for R2P.297  As a 
result, there was little political will left for any consideration of an intervention in Darfur.  
Furthermore, the attention that the UN did give to Sudan during the early 2000s was focused on 
ending a national north-south war.  According to Sharath Srinivasan,  "[P]eace talks prioritized 
solving Sudan's 'north-south' war long before Darfur erupted, and it now led peacemakers to 
create a discursive buffer around this idea for peace by being silent on, downplaying, or 
depoliticizing Darfur's conflict."298  The civil war between north and south Sudan had raged for 
decades, and creating lasting peace in the country was a priority for the UN.   
 Lastly, as previously discussed in conjunction with theoretical arguments against  
humanitarian intervention, the estimated costs versus the expected outcomes, or probability of 
success, has had a great affect on the ability and willingness of states to undertake R2P 
campaigns.  The calculation of cost versus outcome, and whether or not the outcome is beneficial 
                                                 
294
 Cottey, "Beyond Humanitarian Intervention," 431.   
295
 Ibid.    
296
 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention 
in Darfur,” Journal of Military Ethics 5(2) (2006): 154.   
297
 Piiparinen, "Reconsidering the silence over the ultimate crime," 73.   
298
 Srinivasan, "Negotiating violence: Sudan's peacemakers and the war in Darfur," 27.   
  
69 
 
enough to justify the risk of action, happens regularly.  The costs of an international operation 
can be measured in many ways, including monetary value, civilian and military casualties, 
equipment use, potential physical damage, and the political implications.  The humanitarian 
crises in the 1990s that led to the creation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine also proved 
very costly to the nations involved.  During the US intervention in Somalia in 1993, at least 500 
Somalis were killed in one day.299  Up to 1,500 Somalis were killed during the entirety of the 
campaign and over half of them were women and children. 300  When NATO intervened in 
Kosovo in 1999, aside from the military deaths more than 500 civilians were killed in the largely 
indiscriminate air attacks.301   
 As previously discussed, a basic yet major problem for the United Nations is a lack of 
available military forces and equipment.  These difficulties affected the decision-making in the 
case of Darfur.  Based on the reluctance of the government of Sudan to support a UN 
intervention, few available troops and equipment, and a perceived inability to provide security 
for peacekeepers on the ground, the Security Council was disinclined to intervene.302  It took 
several years until stopping humanitarian crimes in Darfur was deemed sufficiently urgent to 
have a UN peacekeeping presence, and to conclude that the risk to that UN presence was small 
enough.  Although the conflict was stated to be a threat to international peace and security in 
2004,303 quelling the violence was seen as too difficult, and not sufficiently important, to rally a 
full intervention. 
 
Analysis of Libya 
 
 In contrast to the lack of definitive action in Darfur, intervention in Libya was swift and 
decisive.  The most significant ways that language affected the decision to intervene in Libya 
were the constant public reiterations of human rights violations, Gadhafi's threats of impending 
massacres, and the international emphasis on collective responsibility.  Gadhafi warned early on 
that he intended to "purge Libya inch by inch, room by room, household by household, alley by 
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alley, and individual by individual until the country [was] purified."304  During the crisis in 
Darfur, the international community refused to officially label the situation as genocide.  In the 
months before the Libyan intervention, there was less violence than in Darfur but the situation 
was still considered to be a possible crime against humanity.305  Under the R2P doctrine, crimes 
against humanity and genocide are humanitarian crises that require the attention of the 
international community.  In this case, the international community acted with much greater 
urgency over the humanitarian crimes in Libya and the potential for much further blood to be 
spilled, as Gadhafi warned repeatedly that he would show no mercy to those participating in the 
rebellion.   
 In terms of the proximity to other major operations, especially the two largest occupations 
in the Middle East in recent history, a significant amount of time had passed before the Libyan 
conflict began.  Importantly, and although set within the context of the rising Arab Spring, 
Resolution 1973 was not enacted during an atmosphere of fatigue and stress from recent military 
expenditures, as was arguably the case in 2004 in Darfur.  The "Iraq Syndrome," which 
contributed greatly to the reluctance of western states to undergo a more forceful humanitarian 
intervention in Darfur,306 had lessened considerably since 2004.  American troops were being 
withdrawn from Iraq in 2011, almost 10 years after the original occupation began.  Troop 
commitments from several nations were also being slowly pulled out of Afghanistan, a country 
in which the most recent conflict had begun in 2001.  The fixation of the world on these two 
regions diminished, allowing for other crisis areas to become more of a focus.  
 The perceived cost of intervening in Libya versus the anticipated outcome was a significant 
factor in the UN's authorization of force.  The cost of the intervention was considered to be small 
because there would be no troops on the ground.  The possible risk to human life and the 
approximate cost of enforcing a no-fly zone through NATO was deemed far less of a collective 
risk than allowing Gadhafi to continue on a largely unopposed pattern of violence in heavily 
populated areas.  As Eckert commented,    
[In Libya]...NATO was able to intervene without putting forces on the ground by relying 
on air power and weapons launched from offshore...The dynamics of the international 
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system mean that state interests permitted intervention in Libya, where intervention could 
be carried out at a relatively low cost through air power. 307   
In contrast with the UN response to Darfur, which deemed intervention much too difficult and 
the landscape too unmanageable to risk a large-scale operation, the Libyan environment fit 
favourably with the proposed R2P intervention.  As previously discussed, the civil and political 
situation in Libya following the intervention has continued to spiral out of control and the 
civilian death toll continues to rise.  In retrospect, the residual costs of the intervention may seem 
high.  However, during the negotiations for Resolution 1973, there was little perception of risk to 
the UN member states tasked with carrying out the intervention. 
In terms of national interests, power and influence in the turbulent Middle East has been a 
contentious issue for many years.  Although Gadhafi had economically supported many African 
leaders,308 he was not a current ally of any of the permanent members of the Security Council.  
Over the years, the Gadhafi regime had "fallen out with both his neighbours and the West...[and] 
both Western and Arab leaders openly said they wanted [him] to go."309  The League of Arab 
States (LAS), or the Arab League, has 22 member countries primarily in and around North 
Africa and Southeast Asia, including Libya.  The LAS is an organization of like-minded nations 
and has obvious vested interests in the stability of the region and its members.  The national 
interests of these vocal UN member states were a prime factor in bringing the Libyan situatio n to 
the forefront.310  In this case, national security concerns, and the possibility of  violence 
spreading across borders, were as influential as strategic interests.  Turkey had voiced concerns 
that some UN members are "driven by opportunism" in the region and may have been 
harbouring "secret intentions" before the intervention in Libya. 311  Both Turkey and Russia had 
publicly indicated, without naming specifics, that members of the coalition forces during the 
Libyan intervention were selfishly pursuing action to gain power in the region. 312 
Aral Berdal states that Resolution 1973 could be praised for its goal of civilian protection, 
but it could also be criticized for "its selectivity, [and] the apparent imperial greed that colored 
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the behaviour of...the US, France, Britain and Italy."313  According to Berdal, the United States 
and the UK were driven to intervene in Libya by a desire to settle "old scores" with the Gadha fi 
regime, which had previously been unfriendly to Western interests in the region. 314  For many 
members of the United Nations, and the United States in particular, there is a constant struggle in 
implementing foreign policy.  Pierre Atlas argues that there is a tension, specifically in American 
foreign policy, between "pursuing American 'values' (foreign policy idealism) and protecting 
American 'interests' (foreign policy realism)."315  For decades, this tension has stemmed from an 
American interest to, on the one hand, "make the world safe for democracy"316 and on the other, 
a need to protect political, security, and economic interests.  Protecting these interests sometimes 
means supporting dictatorships and "nondemocratic regimes."317  In the case of Libya, the United 
States has had long-standing interests in Middle Eastern oil and the protection of its Israeli ally.  
The Libyan regime under Gadhafi threatened these American interests in the region.  For the 
United Nations, there is an endless struggle between the responsibilities of the organization 
internationally and the individual needs of its member states.  
Although the UN had the consent of the League of Arab States, the Libyan no-fly zone 
was, understandably, implemented without the support of the Gadhafi regime.  Under the 
principles of the Responsibility to Protect, the consent of the government in question is not 
required for an intervention to take place.  The support of the Arab League indicated regional 
consent to intervention.  In the event that a government is deemed non-functional or incapable of 
protecting its civilians, an association of familiar neighbours can be a convincing alternative to 
the consent of the government in question.  Regional consent, in the interest of the safety of 
Libyans and surrounding citizens, influenced the Security Council in a way the African Union 
alone was unable to achieve in Sudan.  The advocacy of the African Union and the Arab League 
also had an impact on China and Russia, who chose to abstain from voting on Resolution 1973 
rather than veto it.  According to Berdal, these decisions were made, in part, by a desire to not  
"rock the boat" and upset regional allies.318  The Libyan crisis was also the first time since the 
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adoption of R2P that the Security Council authorized the use of force for human protection 
against the will of a functioning state.319  The UN took international action in opposition to an 
existing governing regime for the purposes of protecting civilians.  Thus the initial intervention 
in Libya reinforced the principles of R2P and indicated significant change in intervention norms. 
The United Nations Security Council responded in contrasting ways to the crises in Libya 
and Darfur because of a variety of factors.  Support for humanitarian intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect was important during the UN's response to the Libyan crisis.  Despite 
obstacles and an inconsistent track record, humanitarian intervention and the R2P doctrine have 
been gaining international acceptance for many years.  The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is 
the result of a series of humanitarian crises and a decade of developing intervention norms.  
After humanitarian intervention grew out of peacekeeping, it was shaped both by challenges and 
successes throughout the 1990s and 2000s, eventually leading to the introduction of R2P.  The 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine was not officially adopted by the United Nations until 2005, 
two years after the initial crisis in Darfur began.  A simple difference between the two cases is 
the absence of established principles of the Responsibility to Protect during the outbreak of 
violence in Darfur. 
Alex Bellamy argues that the adoption of R2P signals a trend in international relations that 
began with massacres in the 1990s like Rwanda and has reached its culmination with the recent 
intervention in Libya.  According to Bellamy, a new “politics of protection”320 is showing itself 
in international relations.  In conjunction with the evolution of humanitarian intervention, this 
theoretically new idea has four characteristics:  (1) international society is appearing to be 
overwhelmingly focused on civilian protection; (2) the Security Council has proven to be willing 
to use military force for human protection; (3) the relationship between the United Nations 
Security Council and other stakeholders is becoming very crucial to decision-making and the 
authorization of force; and (4) cautious states are now agreeing to respond to crises through the 
Security Council.321  In the wake of the ongoing Syrian crisis, it would seem as though this new 
politics of protection has fallen to the wayside.  The intervention track record of the UNSC is 
still mixed and R2P was only adopted in 2005; not enough time has yet passed for these patterns 
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to be proved permanent.  However, as the conclusion will show, proponents of the Responsibility 
to Protect remain optimistic about the potential of the doctrine and its principles.   
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Conclusion The Responsibility to Protect Post-Libya and Future Prospects for 
Humanitarian Intervention    
 
The crisis in Libya and the ensuing action by the United Nations demonstrates that 
humanitarian intervention has gained ground within the international community and that the 
R2P doctrine is a new platform upon which the concept will be able to grow.  The international 
response to Libya is the first example of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine being partially 
used as a motivating factor for an actual intervention.  It is a key event in R2P's integration into 
international norms.  As previously discussed, much criticism has arisen in the wake of the UN 
campaign.  Violence continues to tear Libya apart despite the military intervention on behalf of 
the United Nations.  In a follow up report to the World Summit Outcome document in 2005, the 
Secretary  General detailed the necessary steps to implement the Responsibility to Protect.  The 
Secretary General concluded the report with six core priorities for implementing the 
responsibility to protect over the next decade:        
(1) signalling political commitment at the national, regional and global levels to protect 
populations from atrocity crimes; (2) elevating prevention as a core aspect of the 
responsibility to protect; (3) clarifying and expanding options for timely and decisive 
response; (4) addressing the risk of recurrence; (5) enhancing regional action to prevent 
and respond to atrocity crimes; and (6) strengthening international networks dedicated to 
genocide prevention and the responsibility to protect. 322  
With the reference to R2P in Resolution 1973 on the Libyan conflict, the Security Council has 
acknowledged political commitment to protecting populations at the global level, the first 
priority for implementing the doctrine.  Furthermore, the League of Arab States was instrumental 
in drawing support for an intervention in Libya, which is a limited example of regional action in 
response to atrocity crimes.  The majority of these steps have yet to be applied, but attitudes 
toward international responsibility during civil conflicts appear to be changing.  The case studies 
in Darfur and Libya are evidence that the Responsibility to Protect is in the process of being 
implemented, despite the severe limitations on its practical application.   
If the intervention in Libya cast considerable doubt on the relevance of R2P, the 
subsequent crisis in Syria has weakened the credibility of the doctrine.  In March of 2011, the 
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same month that the UN authorized a no-fly zone in Libya, protests began in Syria.  The conflict 
started over the arrest of a few revolutionary teenagers and quickly escalated.  Security forces 
began firing on and killing demonstrators, eventually triggering nationwide protests against the 
rule of President Bashar al-Assad.323  The conflict has been tearing apart the country of Syria 
since that time and has taken a considerable toll.  More than 250,000 have died thus far and more 
than nine million are homeless.  Both the opposition groups to al-Assad and the government 
forces have been accused of war crimes.324   Syria has fallen into a deadly civil war.325  Thus far, 
the United Nations has refrained from authorized intervention and has responded by attempting 
peace talks, stating that only a political solution326 can save Syria.327  
Akin to the crisis in Darfur, recent debates about intervention in Syria have also been 
stalled by the language being used and the wording of certain agreements.  Partially a result of 
disputes about overstepping the resolution for intervention in Libya – a problem with different 
conceptions of what actions the wording of Resolution 1973 authorized – there have been major 
arguments over whether or not the text of a proposed resolution will include ‘terrorism’ as a 
critical component and how it describes the actions of the Assad regime.328  Nick Bryant writes 
that "balanced wording"329 will continue to be important for finding consensus over the 
appropriate action in Syria.  According to a senior Western diplomat involved in the UN 
negotiations, "The balance is between getting a text that will make a difference [in Syria]...whilst 
at the same time getting the Russians on board.”330  The worsening situation in Libya and the 
ongoing violence in Syria have led many to the conclusion that the Responsibility to Protect is 
conceptually weak and practically dead. 
Besides a seemingly abysmal track record since its adoption, there is heavy criticism 
stemming from the Libyan crisis that suggest the R2P doctrine has been a failure.  Since 2005, 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has had little practical application.  In Libya, the political 
and civil situation in the country has arguably worsened.  Alan J Kuperman argues in Foreign 
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Affairs that the Libyan intervention was not justifiable on any grounds, and especially not under 
the R2P doctrine.  According to Kuperman, the Libyan intervention was an "abject failure," 
because of Libya's current status as a failed state and a haven for extremist militias, and a better 
policy option would have been not intervening at all. 331  Years after the initial resolution to 
intervene in Libya, many argue that the doctrine has lost all meaning and authority since "the UN 
Security Council and NATO failed in every way to effectively implement R2P." 332  States and 
international bodies have demonstrated that few countries or organizations want the 
responsibility for human protection.333  Some members of the academic community suggest 
abandoning the already fading concept.  Former Supreme Court justice Louise Arbour believes 
that "[R2P's] imposition by the UN in Libya, and the resulting chaos, severely crippled the notion 
of a legal intervention."334  As previously discussed, she argues that the Western notions of 
human rights and humanitarian interventions, up to and including the Responsibility to Protect, 
need to be completely rethought to combat serious international disconnects in ability, 
effectiveness and perceived intentions.  
Despite heavy criticism after the Libyan intervention, there is reason to believe that the 
Responsibility to Protect still has potential for resolving crises in international affairs.  To begin 
with, Resolution 1973 and the reference to the Responsibility to Protect in Libya worked exactly 
as it should have, in response to need, and under the correct authorities.  Bellamy commented 
that,  "Consensus on the use of force against Libya was enabled by several exceptional factors, in 
particular a putative regional consensus and the poor international standing of Qadhafi’s regime, 
as well as the clarity of the threat and short timeframe for action."335  The resolution was enacted 
to impose a no-fly zone in the solid belief that the world had to protect the people of Libya.  The 
government was manifestly failing in its duties and was threatening massacre.  Although some 
argue, in retrospect, that Colonel Gadhafi had had no intentions of killing citizens en masse and 
that the intervention escalated the violence336, the history of violence and oppression under the 
Gadhafi regime speaks to a different social reality.  The prison massacre of 1200 people in 1996, 
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the existence of a violent secret police, and the brutal government crackdowns on protesters 
proves that there was a demonstrated disregard for human life.337  In the days and months 
preceding the UN authorization of military intervention, the calls for UN action were numerous 
and definitive. The decision to intervene was highly praised internationally.338  The UN had the 
support of the Arab League in Resolution 1973, and  in fact, was being lobbied heavily for some 
kind of action.  Afterwards, it is easy to critique UN action but it is difficult to claim that Libya 
would have been better off without an intervention.   The country was already in civil turmoil 
before the UN intervened and Gadhafi had vowed to die before he surrendered control. 
The most controversial aspect of the Libyan operation was the NATO mission extension 
and the subsequent toppling of the Gadhafi regime.  This "mission creep" is cited as a major 
cause of UN indecision over Syria and the Russian opposition to any further authorization of 
intervention under the guise of R2P.339  However, R2P needs to be viewed in the context of the 
initial decision to intervene and not in the context of the mission extension.  The extended 
operation and the toppling of the regime was not under the mandate of the Responsibility to 
Protect and is not an appropriate indicator of the value of the principle.  Misapplication of the 
principles of  R2P is the responsibility of UN member states.  Russia consistently attempted to 
validate its involvement in the Ukraine and Georgia under the guise of the Responsibility to 
Protect, but this should not delegitimize the concept itself.340  There has definitely been "some 
infection of the whole R2P concept by the perception, accurate or otherwise, that the civilian 
protection mandate granted by the Council was manifestly exceeded by that military 
operation."341 
The implementation of the intervention, the mission extension, and the failure of the 
international community to support the redevelopment of Libyan society post-intervention may 
                                                 
337
 Ian Black, " Libya violating human rights despite new image, says Amnesty,"  The Guardian, June 23, 2010, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/23/ libya-human-rights-image-amnesty;  Ian Black and Owen Bowcott, 
"Libya protests: massacres reported as Gaddafi imposes news blackout,"  The Guardian, February 18, 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/18/ libya-protests-massacres-reported.     
338
 Peter Preston, "Remember Srebrenica? The west's intervention in Libya is a no-brainers," The Guardian, May 29, 
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/29/srebrenica-libya-intervention-no-brainer.   
339
 Chris Keeler, "The End of the Responsibility to Protect?"  Foreign Policy Journal, October 12, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy journal.com/2011/10/12/the-end-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/.   
340
 Mark Kersten,  "Does Russia have a 'responsibility to protect' Ukraine? Don't buy it,"  The Globe and Mail,  
March 4, 2014,  http://www.theglobeandmail.com/g lobe-debate/does-russia-have-a-responsibility-to-protect-
ukraine-dont-buy-it/article17271450/. 
341
 Gareth Evans,  "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria," address to Annual Castan Centre for 
Human Rights Law Conference, Melbourne, Ju ly 20, 2012,  http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech476.html.   
  
79 
 
have been unjust but Resolution 1973 was not.  It was a unanimous resolution with "no 
dissenting voices, and expressly invoking the principle of responsibility to protect [to authorize] 
the use of 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians at imminent risk of massacre in Benghazi 
and elsewhere in Gaddafi's Libya."342  If UN member states fail to adhere to certain principles, it 
is not appropriate to abandon the principles.  There may be a clear need to further define and 
consolidate the doctrine, but the Security Council and the rest of the UN membership needs to 
commit to making the prevention of humanitarian atrocities a collective priority. 
The creation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was the culmination of the evolution 
of lengthy debates about humanitarian intervention.  The principles of the Responsibility to 
Protect are meant to improve the practice of protecting populations from humanitarian disaster 
and change international norms about intervening on a humanitarian basis.  For proponents of 
R2P, the doctrine affirms the right of countries to intervene and mandates that states are obliged 
to take action when necessary.  The R2P principles are also focused on the language of 
intervention and the rights of nations to intervene associated with the rights of people to be 
protected.  The Responsibility to Protect doctrine changes the terms of humanitarian intervention 
to concentrate on the rights of people to live in a safe environment, free from chronic war and 
violence, under the protection of their governments, rather than the rightness of external state 
intervention.  R2P also prioritizes the safeguarding of innocent lives over other constraints to 
intervention.  The doctrine promotes foregoing the necessity of host-state consent, delegitimizes 
the proximity of other conflicts, and downplays calculations of cost and benefits.  R2P is, in 
geopolitical terms, the high point in the development of humanitarian intervention and remains a 
legitimate and relevant tool for the UN and independent states in their efforts for international 
peace and security.  For R2P to be successfully integrated into UN doctrine, there need to be 
alternative ways to thinking about humanitarianism that can overcome systemic constraints and 
situational obstacles. 
Post-Libya, proponents of R2P have not abandoned hope.   According to Welsh, Thielking, 
and MacFarlane, the concepts of sovereignty and intervention should be complementary, not 
contradictory, and the ICISS made a sufficient step in the direction of reshaping the concept of 
sovereignty with the debate it created and the introduction of  R2P.  They argue that "it is 
acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the 
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sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of a ll the people 
within the state."343  The acceptance of the R2P principle into international society has not only 
shed light on the debate surrounding the long-standing issue of sovereignty, but arguably "has 
made non-intervention in the face of mass atrocity crimes less likely,"344 which was a main goal 
of Kofi Annan's robust advocacy.  As Dunne observed, "The legitimacy accorded to R2P is 
sufficiently broad and deep to mean that it is more difficult for states to continue with 'business 
as usual' when mass atrocity crimes are occurring."345  It will take some time to determine if this 
will truly be a lasting change for humanitarian intervention and the crisis in Syria could disprove 
this argument.  But the Libyan intervention is, for many, an example of where international 
norms are headed. 
Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki Moon reinforced the importance of R2P 
while acknowledging the work still to be done when he said, "Our debates are about how, not 
whether to implement the Responsibility to Protect.  No government questions the principle."346  
Even member states that had previously been opposed to violating external sovereignty under 
any circumstances are becoming more accustomed to changing norms.  Even though China 
continues to support a "strong conception of state sovereignty and noninterference" in its foreign 
policy, since the end of the Cold War it has shown a "willingness to acquiesce in and even 
actively support, multilateral humanitarian interventions that obtain both Security Council 
authorization and target state consent."347  Beijing has also "adopted certain tenets of the concept 
of "the responsibility to protect," suggesting that China is not as inflexible on sovereignty and 
intervention as some suppose."348  Jonathan E. Davis observed that China has shown a 
willingness to consider humanitarian crises as threats to international peace and security and in 
January 2005, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya agreed that the international community has 
a residual responsibility to protect citizens, secondary to the responsibility of the sovereign 
state.349 
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The Libyan intervention may not be an ideal example of the peace-enforcing capabilities of 
the UN, but international examples continue to show that humanitarian intervention remains a 
legitimate tactic.  As Thomas Weiss observed,      
In December 2013...the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized military action to 
counter the Central African Republic’s (CAR) genocidal chaos. Subsequently France, the 
ex-colonial power, joined forces with the post-colonial African Union (AU) to deploy 
troops to protect civilians. The UNSC also imposed an arms embargo on the country and 
warned the UN of the need for a possible peacekeeping mission. In another example, the 
UNSC in April 2013 approved action in Mali, led by France and the 15-nation Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to counter Islamist extremists. 350    
Both the African-led International Support Mission in Central Africa (MISCA), established by 
Resolution 2127, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA), established by Resolution 2100, were authorized by the UN Security Council 
to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and stabilize the conflicts in CAR and Mali.  
Furthermore, the Security Council made reference to the R2P doctrine in both cases.  Resolutions 
2127 and 2100 acknowledged that the transitional government authorities in each country had a 
responsibility to protect their populations.351 
Gareth Evans is also optimistic about the Responsibility to Protect, even after Libya, and 
continues to promote its value amidst heavy opposition.  As one of the creators of the doctrine, 
he understood the difficulties that lie ahead for international consensus and gives suggestions for 
supplementary principles to further define R2P for practical use.  The alternative to working 
within the adopted framework of R2P, he argues, is not an option;   
I don't think there is any policymaker in the world who fails to understand that if the 
Security Council does not find a way of genuinely cooperating to resolve these cases, 
working within the nuanced and multidimensional framework of the R2P principle, the 
alternative is a return to the bad old days of Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo.  That 
means either total, disastrous inaction in the face of mass atrocity crimes, or action being 
taken to stop them without authorization by the Security Council, in defiance of the UN 
Charter and every principle of a rule based international order.  After all that has been 
achieved over the last decade, that would be heartbreaking.352     
Before the United Nations became a legitimate global governance organization, it went through a 
complex creation period.  The Responsibility to Protect has entered a similarly difficult phase 
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post-Libyan intervention.  Despite this, the Responsibility to Protect has the potential to endure 
current crises if the international community renews its commitment to stop atrocities before 
they happen and step in if governments allow them to happen.   
For international political norms to develop, a great amount of time and persistent energy 
must be expended.  Democracy took hundreds of years to become the dominant system of 
governance on the planet, and is still being developed and implemented in different parts of the 
modern world.  Illustrated by the historical political development of countries like France, Italy, 
and Germany, "stable liberal democracy usually emerges only at the end of long, often violent 
struggles, with many twists, turns, false starts, and detours."353  With respect to the case of Libya, 
whose peace and democratic success seems, at present, to be partially linked to the survival of 
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, Sheri Berman states that, "History tells us that societies 
cannot overcome their problems unless and until they face them squarely.  The toppling of a 
long-standing authoritarian regime is not the end of a process of democratization but the 
beginning of it."354  The development of democracy, in comparison to the implementation of the 
R2P doctrine, is a disproportionate example of change in international relations.  However, it 
demonstrates the difficulty of updating traditional norms about sovereignty and human rights, 
which are central to R2P.  The Responsibility to Protect has not been unequivocally adopted but 
it has not been a complete failure either.  Incremental gains throughout the past several years are 
evidence of its partial adoption.  The Responsibility to Protect has, for some, reached an impasse 
within the context of recent international developments.  In the fresh aftermath of  crises where 
mistakes may have been made and criticism is convenient, it is easy to condemn ideas that are 
conceptually at an early stage in their development.  However, humanitarian intervent ion 
remains a necessary tool of the UN.  To give up on progress because of setbacks would be 
counter-productive.  The mixed situational priorities of UN member states should not 
overshadow years of discussion and intellectual innovation.  
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